Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture? by Rulli, Louis S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2017 
Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth 
Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive 
Punishment in Civil Forfeiture? 
Louis S. Rulli 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal 
Procedure Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Repository Citation 
Rulli, Louis S., "Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities 
and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 
1943. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1943 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 
1111 
SEIZING FAMILY HOMES FROM THE INNOCENT:  
CAN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECT MINORITIES 
 AND THE POOR FROM EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT  
IN CIVIL FORFEITURE? 
Louis S. Rulli* 
ABSTRACT 
Civil forfeiture laws permit the government to seize and forfeit private property that has allegedly facilitated a crime 
without ever charging the owner with any criminal offense.  The government extracts payment in kind—property—
and gives nothing to the owner in return, based upon a legal fiction that the property has done wrong.  As such, the 
government’s taking of property through civil forfeiture is punitive in nature and constrained by the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, which is intended to curb abusive punishments.   
The Supreme Court’s failure to announce a definitive test for determining the constitutional excessiveness of civil 
forfeiture takings under the Eighth Amendment has led to disagreement among state and federal courts on the proper 
standard.  At the same time, the War on Drugs has resulted in an explosion of civil forfeiture filings against the 
property of ordinary citizens—many are whom are innocent of any wrongdoing—and therefore there is a profound 
need for a robust constitutional test that satisfies the Eighth Amendment’s original purposes.  This need has grown 
more urgent because civil forfeiture practices are increasingly plagued by police abuses motivated by self-gain, and 
recent studies show that civil forfeitures disproportionately affect low-income and minority individuals who are 
least able to defend their hard-earned property.  
This Article documents the aggressive use of civil forfeiture in Pennsylvania and, by way of illustration, presents 
the plight of elderly, African-American homeowners in Philadelphia who were not charged with any crime and yet 
faced the loss of their homes because their adult children were arrested for minor drug offenses.  In such cases, the 
Eighth Amendment should play a vital role in preventing excessive punishments.  But some courts mistakenly apply 
a rigid proportionality test, upon prosecutorial urging, that simply compares the market value of the home to the 
maximum statutory fine for the underlying drug offense.  When a home value is shown to be less than the maximum 
fine, these courts presume the taking to be constitutional.  Under such a one-dimensional test, prosecutors routinely 
win because the cumulative maximum fines for even minor drug offenses almost always exceed the market values 
of modest, inner-city homes.  This cannot be the proper test.  Instead, this Article contends that the proper 
constitutional test for excessiveness must be a searching, fact-intensive inquiry, in which courts are required to 
balance five essential factors: (1) the relative instrumentality of the property at issue to the predicate offense; (2) the 
relative culpability of the property owner; (3) the proportionality between the value of the property at issue and the 
 
 * Practice Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  I am deeply indebted to Zachary Manning (L’17), a talented research assistant and won-
derful colleague, for his excellent research assistance and invaluable contributions to the prepara-
tion of this Article.  I also want to express my deep appreciation to Barron Flood (L’16) who, as a 
third-year student, provided excellent assistance on an amicus brief in a civil forfeiture appeal in 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which is discussed in this Article.  Some of the arguments and 
empirical findings in this Article owe their roots to the collaborative work completed for that brief 
by Barron and other student colleagues, and particularly attorneys Susanna Greenberg and Molly 
Tack-Hooper, who co-authored the amicus brief with me. 
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gravity of the predicate offense; (4) the harm (if any) to the community caused by the offending conduct; and (5) 
the consequences of forfeiture to the property owner.  
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I.  THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE 
A fundamental responsibility of government in a free society is to protect 
and defend the liberty of every citizen and, when necessary, to punish those 
who violate or infringe upon the safety and rights of others.1  But the power 
to punish is not unlimited.  The Bill of Rights wisely constrains this authority 
 
 1 See, e.g., CAESAR BONESANA & MARQUIS BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
17 (Edward D. Ingraham, trans., 2d Am. ed. 1819) (1764) [hereinafter BONESANA & BECCARIA, 
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (“[T]he sovereign’s right to punish crimes is founded . . . upon 
the necessity of defending the public liberty, entrusted to [its] care, from the usurpation of individ-
uals . . . .”).  Per Beccaria, the “public liberty” is the aggregate sum of the liberty relinquished by 
each individual in political society in exchange for the peace and security that society provides.  Id. 
at 15–18. 
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to ensure that it is not abused,2 and it confers upon an independent judiciary 
the solemn responsibility to guard its use.3  Human experience has taught us 
that punishment powers are prone to abuse in government’s zeal to protect 
public safety and, sometimes, to serve its own interests. 
As early as 1215, Magna Carta placed important limits on the English 
government’s authority to impose fines payable to the Crown for civil and 
criminal wrongs.4  The first such limit was a proportionality requirement: a 
fine was required to relate to the gravity or degree of the predicate offense.5  
The second limit was a “livelihood-protection” requirement—the salvo con-
tenemento principle.6  The essence of the salvo contenemento principle is that a fine 
may not deprive one of his livelihood; the individual fined must still have 
sufficient means to sustain himself and his dependents.7  Thus, in imposing a 
fine, the government had to tailor the fine to the gravity of the offense and it 
 
 2 James Madison noted the limit on governmental power in an address on June 8, 1789 to the First 
Congress, “The great object [of a bill of rights] is to limit and qualify the powers of government, 
by excepting out of the grant of power cases in which the government ought not to act, or [ought] 
to act only in a particular mode. . . . [T]hese exceptions [are pointed] sometimes against the abuse 
of the executive power, sometimes against the legislative . . . .”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.]. 
 3 The vital role of the judiciary in constitutional enforcement was emphasized by James Madison, 
“If [a bill of rights is] incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will con-
sider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable 
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led 
to resist every encroachment upon [those] rights . . . .”  Id. at 439. 
 4 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270 (1989) 
(“In response to the frequent, and occasionally abusive, use of amercements by the King, Magna 
Carta included several provisions placing limits on the circumstances under which a person could 
be amerced, and the amount of the amercement.”).  See also Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability 
to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 854 (2013) 
(“Chapter 14 of . . . Magna Carta govern[ed] the assessment of amercements, an early form of 
fines.”) [hereinafter McLean, Original Meaning]. 
 5 See Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT LARGE 5 (1762 ed.).  Chapter 14 of Magna 
Carta (as translated) provides, “A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offense, except in 
accordance with the measure of that same offense; and for a great offense, in accordance with the 
magnitude of [that] offense; [and] saving his contenement; and a merchant [shall be amerced] in 
the same manner, saving his merchandise; and a tenant farmer [shall be amerced] in the same 
manner, saving his wainage.”  Id. (translation mine). See also McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, 
at 865–66 (stating that Magna Carta’s prohibitions on excessive amercements included a “propor-
tionality principle”). 
 6 See Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT LARGE 5 (1762 ed.); McLean, Original 
Meaning, supra note 4, at 855 (“[T]o save a man’s ‘contenement’ was to leave him sufficient for the 
sustenance of himself and those dependent on him.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372–73 (1769) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES].  Per Blackstone, the essence of the salvo contenemento principle is that “no man 
shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or personal estate will 
bear . . . .”  Id. 
 7 See, e.g., McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, at 854–56 (noting that fines in English jurisprudence 
were generally allocated “according to ability to pay”); BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 
6, at *372–73 (stating that amercements are allocated based on ability to pay). 
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had to take into account the individual’s financial situation, lest he be robbed 
of his livelihood.8 
In the 1680s, English fines “became even more excessive and partisan.”9  
As a result, additional limitations on excessive fines were placed in the 1689 
English Bill of Rights by those who had been personally subjected to such 
heavy fines.10  The American colonists were aware of this history and acted 
to limit fines payable to the government in the emerging Republic.11  Prior 
to the ratification of the United States Constitution, eight states had imported 
limitations on excessive fines from British law into their respective declara-
tions of rights or state constitutions.12  “Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia all 
had enacted a Declaration of Rights or a Constitution expressly prohibiting 
excessive fines.”13  Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights (the “Virginia Dec-
laration”), in particular, furnished the “immediate template” for the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.14 
Section 9 of the 1776 Virginia Declaration provided that “excessive bail 
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”15  Similarly, the Eighth Amendment, adopted in 
1791, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”16  The Eighth 
Amendment’s only linguistic change was to substitute a mandatory “shall 
not” for the hortatory “ought not” in Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration. 
Section 9’s language was not novel; the same language also appeared in the 
 
 8 See, e.g., McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, at 855–56 (noting that under Magna Carta’s salvo 
contenemento principle, “[A] minimum core level of economic viability was protected notwithstanding 
the imposition of monetary penalties.”); BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at *372–73 
(stating that gravity and ability to pay have to be taken into account to apply amercements). 
 9 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10 See id.  See also Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from 
History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1253–56 (1987) (detailing the history leading to fine-related pro-
visions of the Declaration of Rights). 
 11 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267 (“The Framers of our Bill of Rights were aware and took 
account of the abuses that led to the 1689 [English] Bill of Rights.”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY 
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 750 (1833) (stating that the Eighth Amendment was “adopted 
as an admonition to all departments of the national government to warn them against such violent 
proceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts.”). 
 12 E.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264 n.5. 
 13 Id. 
 14 McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, at 869. 
 15 Va. Declaration of Rights § 9, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., http://www.na-
tionalcenter.org/VirginiaDeclaration.html (last visited May 9, 2017). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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1689 English Bill of Rights.17  Indeed, the very “spirit” of Section 9 was in-
extricably bound up with English legal tradition, for embodied in Section 9 
was the traditional legal understanding “that [a] fine should be according to 
the degree of the fault and the estate of the offender.”18 
The importance of limiting the federal government’s power to punish was 
expressed in an influential essay written in 1787, prior to the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights.  The essay, entitled Brutus II, tied this limitation to securing 
liberty: 
For the security of liberty it has been declared, “that excessive bail should not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted 
. . . .”  These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under 
that of the individual states; for the power of the former is as complete to the 
purpose of requiring bail, imposing fines, inflicting punishments, . . . and seiz-
ing . . . property . . . as the other.19 
This essay reflected a common founding-era understanding of the justness of 
punishment; namely, that “punishments are just in proportion, as the liberty, 
preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable.”20  A prohibition against 
excessive fines secures and preserves liberty by limiting and qualifying the 
government’s power to “impos[e] fines, inflict[] punishments, and 
seiz[e] . . . property”21 so as to “point . . . against the abuse”22 of such power.  
Acutely aware of British abuses in the imposition of excessive fines, the fram-
ers of the Bill of Rights knew that they needed to limit “the ability of the 
sovereign to use its prosecutorial power, including the power to collect fines, 
for improper ends.”23  And thus, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” 
The precise meaning of the term “excessive fines” in the Eighth Amend-
ment was not spelled out at the time of its adoption.  The records of the First 
 
 17 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 291 (quoting 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 STAT. AT LARGE 440, 
441 (1689)) (“[E]xcessive Baile ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed, nor cruell 
and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”). 
 18 Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 555, 557 (1799) (opinion of Roane, J.).  See also, ALLAN NEVINS, 
THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775–1789 146 (1924) (“In the 
main, [the Virginia Declaration] was a restatement of English principles—the principles of Magna 
Charta, the Petition of Rights . . . and the Revolution of 1688.”). 
 19 Brutus II (Nov. 1, 1787), as reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 621 (Neil H. Cogan, ed., 
1997) [hereinafter Brutus II]. 
 20 BONESANA & BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 1, at 17.  Beccaria’s writings 
on criminal theory and penology profoundly influenced founding-era legal thought.  See, e.g., JOHN 
D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 3–23 (2014) (stating the importance of Beccaria’s writings for the Founding Fathers).  
For example, Beccaria’s writings “materially informed the Founding Fathers’ attitudes and views 
of [the] provisions [of the federal Bill of Rights].”  Id. at 17. 
 21 Brutus II, supra note 19, at 621. 
 22 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 454 (highlighting language from James Madison’s June 8, 1789 
address to the First Congress). 
 23 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267. 
1116 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:5 
Congress do not reveal that any member spoke to its meaning.24  There ap-
pears to be no founding-era material that provides direct meaning of this 
term.25  However, a general understanding of “excessive fines” from this time 
period may be gleaned from Blackstone’s Commentaries.  Blackstone wrote that 
fines should be no larger than a person’s circumstances and holdings could 
bear, as an excessive fine “amount[ed] to imprisonment for life.”26  In light 
of the Eighth Amendment’s history and its English law roots, it is clear that 
the purpose of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause was to limit 
the government’s power to punish,27 and specifically “to limit the govern-
ment’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment 
for some offense.’”28 
Although the Eighth Amendment limits the federal government’s power 
in three distinct areas, Supreme Court jurisprudence has focused most heav-
ily on the clauses governing cruel and unusual punishment and the imposi-
tion of bail.29  Remarkably, the Supreme Court did not address the Excessive 
Fines Clause at all until 1989,30 and since that time has provided only limited 
 
 24 A draft of the Eighth Amendment was considered by the U.S. House of Representatives on August 
17, 1789.  Only one Member, Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, is recorded as having spoken 
on the merits of the Excessive Fines Clause.  Livermore stated as follows: “[T]he [Eighth Amend-
ment] seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but 
as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. . . . What is understood by excessive 
fines? It lies with the court to determine . . . .”  ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 782–83. 
 25 See, e.g., McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, at 839.  Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth 
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 133 (2004). 
 26 Blackstone wrote, 
[T]he reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually regulated by the de-
termination of magna carta, concerning amercements for misbehaviour in matters of civil 
right . . . [namely,] that no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than 
his circumstances or personal estate will bear . . . . [I]t is never usual to assess a larger fine 
than a man is able to pay, without touching the implements of his livelihood, but to inflict 
corporal punishment, or a stated imprisonment, which is better than an excessive fine, for 
that amounts to imprisonment for life. 
  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at *372–73. 
 27 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993) (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 
266–67, 275) (stating that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to limit power of Govern-
ment). 
 28 Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265). 
 29 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (citing the execution of juvenile offenders 
violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 755 (1987) (noting “preventative” pretrial detention on public safety grounds does not per se 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304 (1976) (holding, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, imposition of a death sentence re-
quires individualized consideration of the offender’s character and record and the circumstances 
of the particular offense); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (noting that setting bail at “a figure 
higher than an amount reasonably calculated to” assure an arrestee’s presence at trial violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause). 
 30 See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 259 (examining whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight 
Amendment applies to a civil-jury award of punitive damages). 
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guidance on the interpretation of the Clause as it relates to civil forfeiture 
cases.31  The first Supreme Court case to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to 
civil forfeiture was Austin v. United States,32 decided in 1993.  In Austin, the 
Supreme Court held that in rem civil forfeiture “constitutes ‘payment to a sov-
ereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as such, is subject to the limitations 
of the . . . Excessive Fines Clause.”33  However, the Austin Court expressly 
declined to adopt a constitutional “excessiveness” standard, instead leaving 
it to the lower courts “to consider that question in the first instance.”34 
The Supreme Court’s next major Excessive Fines Clause decision came 
five years later, in United States v. Bajakajian.35  Unlike Austin, which had arisen 
in the civil forfeiture context, Bajakajian arose out of a criminal forfeiture case.36  
In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court announced a proportionality test as the 
touchstone for determining constitutional excessiveness, holding that “a pu-
nitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly dispropor-
tional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”37 
These two decisions—Austin and Bajakajian—comprise the Supreme 
Court’s limited guidance on the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to 
civil and criminal forfeitures of private property.38  However, the explosion 
of civil forfeiture cases in the War on Drugs requires much more guidance in 
developing a robust test for the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to 
punitive forfeitures that is true to its constitutional purpose. 
This Article argues that a fact-intensive, multi-factored standard is needed 
to curb abusive punishments, especially when the government uses strong civil 
forfeiture laws to seize family homes from vulnerable homeowners who are not 
accused of or convicted of a crime.  I contend that the government’s aggressive 
use of civil forfeiture has been plagued by persistent abuses that are motivated 
by self-gain, and that government has largely targeted low-income and minor-
ity communities that are least able to defend their property.  As a result, civil 
forfeiture frequently results in default judgments that deprive property owners 
of their day in court and evade constitutional review under the Excessive Fines 
 
 31 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621–22 (providing limited interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause as it 
relates to civil forfeiture cases); cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (holding a 
forfeiture of money that was not declared violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment). 
 32 509 U.S. at 602. 
 33 Id. at 621–22 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 34 Id. at 622–23. 
 35 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998). 
 36 Id. at 333 (“In this case . . . the Government has sought to punish respondent [Mr. Bajakajian] by 
proceeding against him criminally, in personam, rather than proceeding in rem against the [property 
seized].”). 
 37 Id. at 334. 
 38 It remains to be determined whether Bajakajian’s constitutional “excessiveness” standard applies 
strictly in the civil forfeiture context (as a matter of constitutional law).  See, e.g., United States v. 
Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 815, 815–16 n.4 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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Clause.  For too long, the Excessive Fines Clause has been the Constitution’s 
least observed safeguard when it was needed most to curb government’s abu-
sive punishments.  The time has come for the Excessive Fines Clause to take 
center stage in American jurisprudence. 
II.  AN EXPLOSION IN CIVIL FORFEITURE SEIZURES 
In recent decades, the War on Drugs has brought an explosion of federal 
and state civil forfeiture cases.  Civil forfeiture is an in rem action against prop-
erty that has allegedly facilitated a crime.39  Under civil forfeiture laws, such 
property “can be seized and forfeited to the government . . . without compen-
sation [to the owner].”40  Civil forfeiture turns on the legal fiction of “guilty” 
property;41 the predicate for civil forfeiture is the government’s proof of a 
“nexus” between the property and alleged criminal activity,42 which is some-
times committed by a third party.  The government’s proof of “nexus” need 
only be by a preponderance of the evidence.43  Civil forfeiture does not focus 
on the conduct of the property owner, who often has not committed any of-
fense; rather, the focus is on the property’s “guilt.”  Thus, civil forfeiture does not 
require a criminal conviction of the property owner; indeed, the owner need 
not even be criminally charged.44  On occasion, courts have examined whether 
civil forfeiture implicates procedural due process concerns.45  However, the 
aggressive use of civil forfeiture has largely escaped intense scrutiny under the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 
 
 39 See, e.g., 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES ¶ 2.01 (2015) 
[hereinafter SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE]. 
 40 Yan Slavinskiy, Protecting the Family Home by Reunderstanding United States v. Bajakajian, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2014). 
 41 E.g., SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, supra note 39, at  ¶ 2.01. 
 42 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2017); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6802(j) (2006); Commonwealth v. Nineteen 
Hundred & Twenty Dollars United States Currency, 612 A.2d 614, 618 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). 
 43 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2017); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6802(j) (2006); Nineteen Hundred & Twenty 
Dollars United States Currency, 612 A.2d at 618. 
 44 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Esquilin, 880 A.2d 523, 530 (Pa. 2005) (“[F]or property to be deemed 
forfeitable, neither a criminal prosecution nor a conviction is required.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
TYPES OF FEDERAL FORFEITURE, http://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture (last up-
dated Feb. 1, 2017) (“[N]o criminal charge against the owner is necessary [for civil forfeiture].”). 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (holding that, absent 
exigent circumstances, “the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.”); United 
States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We continue to 
be enormously troubled by the government’s increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil for-
feiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes.”). 
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Civil forfeiture laws date back to the nation’s founding,46 but at their incep-
tion they were primarily used in admiralty and customs cases.47  The govern-
ment needed a powerful tool to stop piracy and smuggling offenses facilitated 
by vessels owned by foreigners outside of American courts’ personal jurisdic-
tion.48  In rem civil forfeiture met that need by obviating in personam proceedings 
against foreign ship owners.49  At the same time, however, the nation’s found-
ers were wary of the punitive nature of forfeiture and its potential for govern-
mental abuse.  Thus, they imported only statutory forfeiture from British law 
and abolished forfeiture of estate in the new Constitution.50 
It was not until the nation’s War on Drugs that civil forfeiture really ex-
ploded and became heavily used against ordinary citizens, many of whom 
were not accused or convicted of a crime.  In 1978, Congress amended the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
(“CDAPCA”) to permit civil forfeiture of currency and negotiable instru-
ments.51  And in 1984, Congress amended the CDAPCA to authorize the 
forfeiture of real property, including family homes.52  Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the 1984 amendments authorized all proceeds from forfeited property 
to be directed to the exclusive accounts of law enforcement, rather than to 
the United States Treasury.53  Thus, law enforcement was able to keep all 
proceeds from forfeited property, and the Department of Justice’s Asset For-
 
 46 See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from 
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 96–99 (1996) [hereinafter Boudreaux & Pritchard, 
Lessons].  Forfeiture law in the United States has roots in English law, which at the time of the 
Eighth Amendment’s ratification authorized three kinds of forfeiture: (1) Deodand, wherein prop-
erty that caused the accidental death of an English subject was forfeited to the Crown; (2) Forfeiture 
of Estate, wherein a person convicted of a felony or treason thereby forfeited all his realty and 
personalty to the Crown; (3) Statutory Forfeiture, wherein property used in violation of customs 
and revenue laws was forfeited to the Crown.  See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611–12.  Only statutory 
forfeiture took hold in the United States.  Id. at 613. 
 47 See, e.g., Boudreaux & Pritchard, Lessons, supra note 46, at 99 (stating that in rem forfeiture’s “tradi-
tional domain” was “customs and admiralty”). 
 48 See, e.g., Stefan B. Herpel, Toward A Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture In America, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1910, 1917–19 (1998) (citing that when personal jurisdiction does not exist, in personam pro-
ceedings to satisfy a claim for restitution or to impose a fine or other penalty will be unavailing). 
 49 See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827) (holding government’s proof that a ship has 
engaged in piratical activity is sufficient to support in rem forfeiture of the ship; no personal convic-
tion of the ship’s owner is required). 
 50 Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.  “The Constitution forbids forfeiture of estate as a punishment for treason 
‘except during the Life of the person attainted.’”  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.).  
“And the First Congress also abolished forfeiture of estate as a punishment for felons.”  Id. (citing 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117). 
 51 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)). 
 52 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 2040, 2050 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)). 
 53 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 309, 98 Stat. 2040, 2051–52 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)). 
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feiture Fund became flush with enormous amounts of money.  The very au-
thorities entrusted with discretion over when to use civil forfeiture laws now 
had a direct financial stake in the outcome of the cases they filed.  In a short 
amount of time, the Department of Justice’s federal asset forfeiture fund grew 
from $338 million in 1996 to $1.3 billion in 2008 to more than $2.0 billion 
today.54  State law enforcement agencies similarly benefited from huge finan-
cial growth derived from civil forfeiture proceeds obtained under state law. 
The explosion of civil forfeiture cases has brought with it persistent alle-
gations of abuse.  The CBS television show, 60 Minutes, highlighted the plight 
of Willie Jones, a black landscaper who was stopped at the Nashville airport 
after being observed paying cash for his airline ticket.55  Law enforcement 
authorities detained Mr. Jones and seized $9,000 in cash from his person 
because, according to police, he matched the profile of a drug courier.56  In 
fact, he was traveling to Texas to buy shrubs for his landscaping business and 
needed cash to do so.  Nonetheless, police confiscated his $9,000, and re-
leased him without ever charging him with a crime.57  Mr. Jones sued the 
government to get his money back and ultimately prevailed, with the presid-
ing judge noting that “the statutory [forfeiture] scheme as well as its admin-
istrative implementation provide[d] substantial opportunity for abuse and 
potentiality for corruption.”58 
In 1991, the Pittsburgh Press published a multi-part series reflecting ten 
months of national research on civil asset forfeiture.59  After reviewing 25,000 
drug seizures, interviewing 1,600 prosecutors, defense lawyers, cops, federal 
agents, and victims, and reviewing court documents in 510 cases, the Press 
series concluded that “seizure and forfeiture, the legal weapons meant to 
eradicate the enemy, have done enormous collateral damage to the inno-
cent.”60  Many examples of forfeiture abuse surfaced.  Police departments 
were found to have kept video games, fancy cars, and attack weaponry.61  
 
 54 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Program: Annual Financial Statement, Fiscal Year 1996 
(Sept. 1997), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/a9732a/index.htm; Dick M. Carpenter II et al., 
INSTIT. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 10 (2d 
ed. Nov. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf 
(citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Program: Annual Financial Statements, Fiscal Years 
2001-2014) [hereinafter POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.)]. 
 55 60 Minutes: You’re Under Arrest (CBS television broadcast Apr. 5, 1992). 
 56 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 6 (1999). 
 57 Id. at 6–7. 
 58 Jones v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
 59 Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: The Law’s Victims in the War On Drugs, 
PITTSBURGH PRESS (Aug. 11-Dec. 22, 1991), reprinted at http://www.fear.org/guilty1.html#1 
[hereinafter Presumed Guilty]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See C.J. Ciaramella, Read How Chicago Police Use Asset Forfeiture as a Slush-Fund for Surveillance Equipment, 
REASON.COM (Sept. 30, 2016, 3:30 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2016/09/30/read-how-chi-
cago-police-use-asset-forfei; Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing Process That 
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According to a former chief of the DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Section, “the de-
partment’s ‘marching orders’ were: ‘Forfeit, forfeit, forfeit. Get money, get 
money, get money.’”62  As civil forfeiture cases increasingly reached appellate 
court review, federal judges expressed serious concerns about aggressive civil 
forfeiture practices.63 
In the 1990s, Congress held bipartisan hearings intended to reform civil 
forfeiture laws and curb abusive governmental practices.  Congress expressed 
strong concern about high default rates in which at least eighty percent of all 
civil forfeiture cases went unchallenged.  Congress also questioned low stat-
utory evidentiary burdens that allowed government to take private property 
easily without adequate protection for property owners, and it expressed in-
creasing concern about civil forfeiture’s apparent disproportionate impact on 
low-income and minority communities.  Representative Henry Hyde, then-
Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, forcefully articu-
lated the need for reform: “Arcane laws originally intended to protect cus-
toms revenues from the depredations of smugglers are now used by govern-
ment to strip innocent Americans of their hard-earned property.”64 
Seven years of legislative efforts led to the passage of the Civil Asset For-
feiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”),65 which brought about only limited 
changes to federal forfeiture law.  Many commentators have regarded 
CAFRA’s impact as disappointing and largely ineffective at leveling the play-
ing field and curbing forfeiture abuses.66  Perhaps most significantly, Con-
gress’ stated goal of encouraging greater use of criminal forfeiture over civil 
forfeiture never materialized. 
 
Split Billions With Local, State Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://wapo.st/14JoV0R?tid=ss_mail. 
 62 Erik Grant Luna, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court’s Constitutional House of Cards, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 409, 433 (1997) (quoting Michael P. Zeldin, as quoted in Naftali Bendavid, Asset Forfeiture, 
Once Sacrosanct, Now Appears Ripe for Reform, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 1).  See also 38 U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 180 (1990) (“We must significantly increase production to reach 
our budget target [for forfeiture revenue].”). 
 63 See, e.g., All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d at 905 (“We continue to be enormously trou-
bled by the government’s increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and 
the disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes.”). 
 64 HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM 
SEIZURE? 5 (1995). 
 65 Pub. L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified in main part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983–85).  CAFRA 
succeeded in elevating government’s burden from probable cause to a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1), instituting innocent owner defenses, § 983(d), providing for 
increased access to legal help, 18 U.S.C. § 983(b), and eliminating cost bonds required to contest 
civil forfeiture actions.  18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(E). 
 66 See, e.g., John Yoder & Brad Cates, Government Self-Interest Corrupted a Crime-Fighting Tool Into an Evil, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://wapo.st/1mjYkQg?tid=ss_mail (“The Asset Forfeiture Re-
form Act was enacted in 2000 to rein in abuses, but virtually nothing has changed.  This is because 
civil forfeiture is fundamentally at odds with our judicial system and notions of fairness. It is unre-
formable.”). 
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Since CAFRA’s enactment, civil forfeiture abuses have continued at 
alarming rates in hot spots across the country.  One highly publicized spot 
involved a highway interdiction program in Tenaha, Texas.67  Tenaha police 
officers seized cash and other valuables from travelers without any legitimate 
suspicion of criminal activity.  Police practices raised serious questions about 
whether police were targeting black and Hispanic drivers traveling on the 
highway.  Law enforcement reportedly seized a total of $3 million from 140 
motorists between 2006 and 2008, during which time they routinely threat-
ened to arrest drivers or seize their children and turn them over to child pro-
tective agencies if motorists did not voluntarily relinquish their property on the 
spot.68 
The Washington Post published an extensive series in 2014 on police sei-
zures and forfeitures that focused largely on the federal government’s adop-
tion of state forfeitures.69  According to the Post, the federal government 
adopted $2.5 billion in cash seizures from state and local law enforcement 
agencies between 2001 and 2014, with roughly $1.7 billion returning to state 
and local law enforcement under the federal equitable sharing program.  The 
Post series documented aggressive policing practices in highway interdictions 
resulting in the seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from motor-
ists and passengers not charged with a crime.  Property owners were required 
to fight lengthy court battles to prove that their possessions were lawfully ac-
quired in order to get their property back.  Only one out of six property sei-
zures was legally challenged, but when a challenge did occur, the government 
voluntarily returned seized cash in 41% of the cases.70 
Additionally, the Post series exposed highly troubling police practices that 
employed private training companies, such as Black Asphalt and Desert 
Snow, to train police officers on how to seize greater amounts of cash on the 
nation’s highways.71  It is for good reason that the Supreme Court has held 
that “forfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within 
both [the] letter and spirit of the law.”72 
 
 67 Rebecca Vallas et al., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FORFEITING THE AMERICAN DREAM 5 (2016), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/31133144/032916_Civi-
lAssetForfeiture-report.pdf [hereinafter FORFEITING THE AMERICAN DREAM]. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/sf/investigative/collection/stop-and-seize-2/. 
 70 Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spend-
ing/. 
 71 Many law enforcement departments have come to rely heavily on proceeds from forfeitures, with 
several hundred leaning on forfeiture revenues to account for 20% or more of their annual budgets 
between 2008 and 2014.  Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/collection/stop-and-seize-2/. 
 72 United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V–8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939). 
June 2017] SEIZING FAMILY HOMES FROM THE INNOCENT 1123 
While much media attention is focused on federal civil forfeitures, the prop-
erty of ordinary citizens is arguably more threatened by police practices under 
state civil forfeiture laws.  Pennsylvania is typical of states that have enacted 
civil forfeiture laws directed at controlled substances and modeled largely upon 
federal civil forfeiture laws.  The Pennsylvania Controlled Substances Forfei-
ture Act,73 enacted in 1988, provides for the seizure and forfeiture of controlled 
substances, of vehicles used to transport controlled substances, and of money 
and real property used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation of Penn-
sylvania’s Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act.74  Forfeited 
property is transferred to the custody of the district attorney if the seizing au-
thority is local, or to the Attorney General if the seizing authority has statewide 
authority.75  Forfeited property may be retained for official use or sold, with all 
proceeds going to law enforcement authorities.76 
Civil forfeiture has become big business in Pennsylvania.  According to 
reports of the Pennsylvania Attorney General, law enforcement authorities 
in Pennsylvania have derived income from forfeited property totaling $17.9 
million in Fiscal Year 2012-13 and $13.3 million in Fiscal Year 2013-14.77  
Since 2000, Pennsylvania has taken in more than $150 million in forfeited 
income from civil asset forfeiture.78 
On a local level, Philadelphia County has aggressively pursued civil for-
feiture against its own residents.  The table below (Table 1) summarizes the 
results of Philadelphia County’s civil forfeiture prosecutions from Fiscal Year 
2005-06 to Fiscal Year 2013-14. 
 
 73 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6801 et seq. (2006). 
 74 Id. at § 6801(a). 
 75 Id. at § 6801(e) 
 76 Id. at § 6801(e)–(h); POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54 at 122 (“[Pennsylvania] law en-
forcement agencies . . . retain 100 percent of all forfeiture proceeds.”). 
 77 OFFICE OF PA. ATT’Y GEN., ASSET FORFEITURE REPORTS, FISCAL YEARS 2012-2014. Fiscal 
Year 2012-13 and Fiscal Year 2013-14 are the last two fiscal years for which official figures are 
available. 
 78 POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54 at 122. 
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TABLE 179 
FISCAL 
YEAR 
CASH 
FORFEITED 
CARS 
FORFEITED 
HOUSES 
FORFEITED 
TOTAL INCOME 
FROM 
FORFEITED 
PROPERTY 
2005–06 $ 4.3 MM 453 99 $ 6.73 MM 
2006–07 $ 3.1 MM 352 85 $ 6.39 MM 
2007–08 $ 3.8 MM 263 68 $ 4.67 MM 
2008–09 $ 4.5 MM 176 118 $ 6.22 MM 
2009–10 $ 4.3 MM 116 90 $ 5.97 MM 
2010–11 $ 4.2 MM 154 114 $ 5.54 MM 
2011–12 $ 3.8 MM 183 96 $ 4.80 MM 
2012–13 $ 3.5 MM 169 38 $ 4.98 MM 
2013–14 $ 2.7 MM 72 38 $ 3.43 MM 
TOTALS $ 34.2 MM 1,938 746 $ 47.73 MM 
 
The forfeiture of such large amounts of private property (especially 
homes) and the direct financial benefit to the budgets and salaries of police 
and prosecutors have caused substantial public concern.  Aggressive civil for-
feiture practices prompted the Philadelphia Inquirer to publish an editorial on 
July 6, 2015, “Dirty Money,” stating: 
Using the state’s civil forfeiture law, which is designed to deprive drug dealers of 
ill-gotten gains, the Philadelphia [D.A.’s] Office has routinely thrown innocent 
people out of their homes on the grounds that investigators believed drug crimes 
took place in them.  The law allows prosecutors to take a property even if the 
owner has not been accused of a crime and, worse, before a judge reviews the 
case.80 
 
 79 OFFICE OF PA. ATT’Y GEN., ASSET FORFEITURE REPORTS, FISCAL YEARS 2005-2014 (on file 
with the author). 
 80 Editorial, Dirty Money, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 6, 2015, at A14.  The Scranton Times-Tribune has re-
peatedly urged reform of Pennsylvania’s “draconian” forfeiture law.  Editorial, Fix State’s Draconian 
Forfeiture Law, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://thetimes-tribune.com/opin-
ion/fix-state-s-draconian-forfeiture-law-1.1414192.  See, e.g., Editorial, Scale Back Forfeiture Rule, 
SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Apr. 30, 2016), http://thetimes-tribune.com/opinion/scale-back-for-
feiture-rule-1.2037010; Editorial, Rein In Law on Forfeiture, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Sept. 28, 
2015), http://thetimes-tribune.com/opinion/rein-in-law-on-forfeiture-1.1949326.  And a Phila-
delphia journalist described local civil forfeiture practices as “seize first, ask questions later.”  Isaiah 
Thompson, The Cash Machine, PHILA. CITY PAPER (Nov. 28, 2012), http://mycitypaper.com/The-
Cash-Machine/ [hereinafter Thompson, The Cash Machine].  Forfeiture practices in Philadelphia’s 
Courtroom 478 have been the subject of national satire on the Daily Show and Last Week Tonight.  
See Highway-Robbing Highway Patrolmen: The Daily Show with John Stewart, COMEDY CENTRAL, 
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/pjxlrn/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-highway-robbing-high-
way-patrolmen; Civil Forfeiture: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kEpZWGgJks&feature=youtu.be.  Even the Common-
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The explosion in civil forfeiture cases is frequently attributed to the direct 
pecuniary interest of law enforcement—one of the most controversial parts of 
civil forfeiture laws.  Pennsylvania directs all forfeiture funds to law enforce-
ment agencies.81  This creates a powerful profit incentive for law enforcement 
authorities that skews prosecutorial discretion and distorts agency priorities.  
In some cases, civil forfeiture proceeds have been handed back to prosecutors 
as bonuses.82  And, for the most part, the flow of forfeited funds directly to law 
enforcement agencies escapes public scrutiny.  Such practices are often criti-
cized as “policing for profit.”83  Prosecutors sometimes attempt to justify their 
receipt of such large sums of forfeiture proceeds on the basis that they direct 
some of these proceeds to anti-drug and crime-fighting programs in the com-
munity.84  But a review of more than a decade of civil forfeiture reports sub-
mitted by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s office reveals that Philadelphia 
County admits to not spending even one dollar of forfeiture proceeds on such 
programs.85  Despite taking in almost 48 million dollars in forfeiture proceeds 
from Fiscal Year 2005-06 to Fiscal Year 2013-14, the Philadelphia DA’s office 
kept it all for its own use.86 
As the War on Drugs has escalated, a powerful weapon given to prosecu-
tors to combat drug kingpins has been turned against everyday motorists who 
have their hard-earned cash seized in dubious highway traffic stops87 and 
 
wealth Court of Pennsylvania has cautioned that it is only strong procedural protections that pre-
vent civil forfeiture from amounting “to little more than state-sanctioned theft.”  Commonwealth 
v. 605 Univ. Drive, 61 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Younge, 667 A.2d 739, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)), rev’d on other grounds, 71 A.3d 915 (Pa. 2013). 
 81 POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54, at 122 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6801(e)–(h)).  
While a majority of states direct all forfeited funds to law enforcement authorities (“LEAs”), seven 
states do not distribute any portion of forfeiture proceeds to LEAs.  Id. at 14 (noting those seven 
states, which are New Mexico, Missouri, Wisconsin, Indiana, North Carolina, Maryland, and 
Maine).  Some other states direct only a percentage of forfeited funds to LEAs.  Id. (including, for 
example, New York: 60%; Texas: 70% at most; California: 66.25%). 
 82 Kaitlyn Foti. Berks D.A., Public Defender Staffs to Receive Bonuses from Drug Forfeitures, POTTSTOWN 
MERCURY (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.pottsmerc.com/arti-
cle/MP/20150108/NEWS/150109671. 
 83 POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54, at 122 (“Pennsylvania earns a D- for its civil forfei-
ture laws” for three reasons: “[1] Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required[;] [2] Poor protec-
tions for innocent third-party property owners[;] [3] 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforce-
ment.”). 
 84 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PA. ATT’Y GEN., ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, 
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Criminal/Asset_Forfeiture_and_Money_Laundering_Sec-
tion/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2016) (“The monies derived from the forfeitures are, in turn, used by law 
enforcement to help fund future drug and other criminal investigations as well as assist community-
based drug and crime-fighting programs throughout the state.”). 
 85 See OFFICE OF THE PA. ATT’Y GEN., ASSET FORFEITURE REPORTS, FISCAL YEARS 2005-14. 
 86 See id.  The same is true of Cumberland and Dauphin Counties in Pennsylvania, two other high 
income-generators of forfeited funds.  Id. 
 87 Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spend-
ing/. 
1126 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:5 
against small entrepreneurs traveling with cash to purchase needed inven-
tory.88  But perhaps most troubling is that prosecutors have turned this pow-
erful weapon against innocent homeowners, whose family homes are seized 
for minor drug transactions they did not commit.  Prosecutors justify the tak-
ing of a family home on the legal fiction that the home has facilitated a crime.  
It is a legal fiction that only lawyers can understand.  The public is left won-
dering how it is possible that the government can take a family’s most im-
portant asset for a crime the homeowner did not commit. 
III.  WEAK PROTECTIONS, HIGH DEFAULTS 
One of the most disturbing aspects of civil forfeiture is its persistently high 
default forfeiture rates.  In too many cases, the government is not required 
to prove the validity of its claims, and property owners never have their day 
in court.  Recent studies demonstrate that property owners frequently lose 
their right to contest the government’s claims and sometimes have little 
choice but to walk away from their hard-earned property.  For example, a 
recent study of Pennsylvania forfeiture cases conducted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Pennsylvania found that Philadelphia 
County has a default forfeiture rate approaching 87%.  The same study also 
found that suburban Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, has a default for-
feiture rate of 90%.89 
Concerns over such high default rates are not new.  Congress was deeply 
troubled by high default rates when it conducted legislative hearings leading 
up to CAFRA’s enactment.  In those hearings, Congress learned that ap-
proximately 80% of all federal forfeitures were uncontested.90  In fact, the 
 
 88 See 60 Minutes: You’re Under Arrest (CBS television broadcast Apr. 5, 1992).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 
106-192, at 6 (1999). 
 89 “The fact that default rates in both counties are so high strongly suggests that no matter how ‘fairly’ 
civil forfeiture is administered, the current law is heavily tilted against the property rights of private 
citizens.”  ACLU OF PA., BROKEN JUSTICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 
IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY 4 (2015), https://www.aclupa.org/files/1814/4526/3118/Bro-
ken_Justice_-_Montgomery_County_final.pdf [hereinafter ACLU OF PA., BROKEN JUSTICE].  
The unfairness of these two counties’ in rem civil forfeiture practices is reflected by the adoption of 
a very different policy in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which includes the City of Pittsburgh.  
See, e.g., Douglas J. Guth, Forfeiture Law Reformers See Allegheny County Policy As Model, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 6, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/re-
gion/2015/12/06/Forfeiture-law-reformers-see-Allegheny-County-policy-as-model/sto-
ries/201512060061 (discussing the differences between civil forfeiture procedures in Allegheny 
County and Philadelphia County).  The Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office has pursued 
in personam criminal forfeiture, rather than in rem civil forfeiture.  See id. (noting that forfeiture pro-
ceedings occur only after a criminal conviction). 
 90 See Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice 
President for Legal Affairs, Cato Institute) (noting the Justice Department’s statement that 80% of 
forfeitures are uncontested).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 28–29 (1997) (discussing the 
reasons why 80% of forfeitures are not contested). 
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Congressional Budget Office reported that only 5% of seizures resulted in 
contested civil cases.91 
There are understandable reasons for such high default rates that have 
nothing to do with the merits of the underlying claims.  Civil forfeiture laws 
provide strong grants of strong authority to government prosecutors while 
providing only weak protections for property owners.92  Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, property owners facing civil forfeiture do not have a constitutional 
right to counsel.93  In a criminal case, an accused who cannot afford legal 
representation is entitled to have a lawyer provided for his or her defense.  For 
more than fifty years since the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Gideon 
v. Wainwright,94 the effective assistance of counsel has been viewed as essential 
to achieving a fair trial.  Although civil forfeitures are punitive and disfavored 
in the law, Pennsylvania law does not provide for a right to counsel for indi-
gent property owners facing civil forfeiture proceedings.95 
Civil forfeiture is a quasi-criminal proceeding that falls between our civil 
and criminal justice systems, and therefore the public defender’s office does not 
usually provide legal assistance.  And, while Pennsylvania has a comprehensive 
network of civil legal aid providers, these non-profit organizations are seriously 
underfunded and struggling with a justice gap that leaves many residents with-
out access to free legal help in civil matters.  According to most studies, only 
20% of low-income Pennsylvanians are able to be served with current re-
sources.96  Legal aid providers have their hands full with assisting indigent cli-
 
 91 146 CONG. REC. H2048  (Apr. 11, 2000). 
 92 See generally POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54, 11–24 (contrasting the risks to property 
and due process rights of civil forfeiture with the financial rewards gained by law enforcement 
officials).  The Policing for Profit report by the Institute of Justice (“IJ”) states “[c]ivil forfeiture laws 
pose some of the greatest threats to property rights in the nation today, too often making it easy 
and lucrative for law enforcement to take and keep property—regardless of the owner’s guilt or 
innocence.”  Id. at 7.  Regarding Pennsylvania’s civil forfeiture laws, IJ’s report is particularly crit-
ical: “Pennsylvania has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in the country.  Earning a [grade of] 
D-, Pennsylvania law only requires law enforcement to tie property to a crime by a preponderance 
of the evidence in order to forfeit it.  Innocent owners are required to prove that they did not 
participate in, give consent to or have knowledge of the criminal activity with which their property 
is associated.  Worst of all, law enforcement agencies have every incentive to seize: They retain 100 
percent of all forfeiture proceeds.”  Id. at 122. 
 93 See, e.g., United States v. Forfeiture Prop., All Apurtenances & Improvements, 803 F. Supp. 1194, 
1197 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding no federal constitutional due process right to appointment of coun-
sel in civil forfeiture proceedings); Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 United States Currency, 704 A.2d 
612, 613 (Pa. 1997) (finding the Due Process Clause does not guarantee appointment of counsel in 
civil forfeiture proceedings). 
 94 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 95 $9,847.00 United States Currency, 704 A.2d at 613. 
 96 See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2d ed. 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocu-
ments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the level of civil legal assistance 
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ents in mortgage foreclosures, child custody, domestic violence, tenant evic-
tions, public benefits, elder abuse, and consumer fraud cases.  As a result, low-
income individuals are mostly on their own when confronting the govern-
ment’s seizure of their property in civil forfeiture cases, and they are ill-
equipped to mount a defense without legal help against government lawyers.97 
The economics of civil forfeiture also contributes to high default rates.  
Most civil forfeiture petitions in Pennsylvania are filed to forfeit cash.  Cash 
forfeitures are the most lucrative part of the forfeiture program.  In Fiscal Year 
2012-13, 76.4% of all income generated from forfeited property in Pennsyl-
vania came from cash forfeitures.98  If the amount of a cash seizure is small, 
as is true in many cash forfeitures, it is just not economically feasible for the 
property owner to lose time from work for multiple court appearances or to 
incur the expense of hiring a lawyer to defend the cash—regardless of the 
property owner’s innocence.  In this common situation, the government wins 
by default because the transactional cost required to defend private property 
exceeds the value of the seized property.  The dark truth is that police are able 
to seize modest sums of cash with near-impunity. 
A 2015 study of cash seizures in Philadelphia County revealed that half 
of all such cases involve sums as small as $192 or even less.99  And an inves-
tigative journalist’s 2012 study of cash forfeitures in Philadelphia County 
concluded that Philadelphia prosecutors regularly forfeit sums as small as 
$100 and that it sometimes took as many as ten separate court dates to obtain 
 
available to low-income Americans); RESOURCE FOR GREAT PROGRAMS, INC., A REPORT ON 
PENNSYLVANIA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, FY 2004-2011, at 6 (May 2012), 
http://www.paiolta.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Report-on-Pennsylvanias-Access-to-Jus-
tice-Act.pdf (“Only 20 percent of low-income Pennsylvanians who experience a legal problem are 
able to get legal help from any source.”). 
 97 In CAFRA, Congress attempted to reduce high default rates in federal civil forfeiture proceedings 
by boosting access to counsel.  “[CAFRA] grants discretionary authority to federal courts to ap-
point counsel where the property owner is accused of criminal activity related to the civil forfeiture 
[18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A)]; it provides for the appointment of counsel as a matter of right at public 
expense for indigent property owners whose primary residences are the subject of the civil forfeiture 
proceeding [18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A)]; and it awards attorney’s fees to claimants who have substan-
tially prevailed in civil forfeiture proceedings [18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(B)].”  Louis S. Rulli, The Long 
Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 87, 88 (2001).  Congress funded the right to counsel for indigent property 
owners with monies from the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund and not from tax dol-
lars.  Id. at 89.  This development has not been adopted by most states, including Pennsylvania.  
See NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, Status Map: Civil Forfeiture, http://www.civil-
righttocounsel.org/map (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) (noting which states have adopted civil forfei-
ture, and specifically noting that Pennsylvania has not). 
 98 See POLICING FOR PROFIT (2d ed.), supra note 54, at 122 (noting the values of forfeited property). 
 99 ACLU OF PA., GUILTY PROPERTY: HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT TAKES $1 MILLION IN CASH 
FROM INNOCENT PHILADELPHIANS EVERY YEAR—AND GETS AWAY WITH IT 7 (2015), 
https://www.aclupa.org/files/3214/3326/0426/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf (end-
note omitted) [hereinafter ACLU OF PA., GUILTY PROPERTY]. 
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a hearing before a judge for the return of this small amount of cash.100  Ac-
cording to this study, the Philadelphia D.A.’s Office filed more than 8,000 
cash forfeiture cases in 2010, seeking to forfeit, on average, just $550 per 
filing.  And in a sample of more than 100 cases from 2011 and 2012, the 
median amount of cash forfeitures was only $178.101 
So long as government is permitted to seize small amounts of cash, default 
rates will remain very high.102  This is extremely troubling as forfeitures-by-
default rob citizens of their hard-earned property without any showing that 
the government is acting lawfully.  There are ways to remedy this, such as 
requiring minimum thresholds for cash forfeitures, but the real solution be-
gins with governmental disclosure of basic information that informs the pub-
lic of the magnitude of this problem and the factors which contribute to its 
occurrence.  The solution begins with transparency.103 
IV.  INNOCENCE DISRESPECTED 
In an earnest effort to combat drug and nuisance crimes, we have compro-
mised our respect for innocence.  While innocence has traditionally com-
manded the highest regard in our justice system,104 we have now compromised 
 
100 Isaiah Thompson, The Cash Machine, PHILA. CITY PAPER (Nov. 28, 2012), http://mycitypa-
per.com/The-Cash-Machine/. 
101 Id. 
102 There is still an economic disincentive to contest the government’s claims even where larger 
amounts are seized.  See, e.g., Louis S. Rulli, On The Road To Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enact-
ment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POLICY 
683, 729 n.200 (2011) [hereinafter Rulli, Civil Gideon] (citing an example where a citizen could 
not afford the attorney’s fees to recover $10,000 in seized cash). 
103 While Pennsylvania authorities do not specifically report default rates in civil forfeiture actions, 
there is ample evidence of high default rates.  Some journalists and non-profit advocacy organiza-
tions have analyzed this information in the absence of government reporting.  The most accurate 
information on actual default rates resides in the records of prosecutors and courts; yet neither 
prosecutors nor courts have undertaken to compile and report this information.  And state legisla-
tors have not required annual reports detailing this essential data.  Legislators require reporting on 
only the most basic information, and surprisingly appear reluctant to scrutinize how civil forfeiture 
actually affects their constituents.  While civil forfeiture takes huge amounts of private property 
from citizens, there is little transparency about how civil forfeiture really functions in local commu-
nities.  Prosecutors allege that civil forfeiture makes communities safer, but there is no empirical 
evidence to support such a claim.  Without question, the government should be required to greatly 
improve forfeiture transparency.  See J. Justin Wilson, State and Federal Governments Must Improve For-
feiture Transparency, INSTIT. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 17, 2017), http://ij.org/press-release/state-federal-
governments-must-improve-forfeiture-transparency/ (rating government transparency in forfei-
ture laws based upon six basic elements of transparency and accountability). 
104 See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 11 THE WORKS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 13 (John Bigelow ed., 1904) (“That it is better a hundred guilty persons 
should escape than one innocent person should suffer, is a maxim that has been long and generally 
approved . . . .”). 
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this respect for unproven promises of enhancing public safety.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bennis v. Michigan105 illustrates this troubling development. 
Tina Bennis owned an automobile jointly with her husband, John Ben-
nis.106  Without Tina’s knowledge and certainly without her consent, John 
drove their car to a part of town where he engaged the services of a prosti-
tute.107  When he did not come home that evening, Tina called Missing Per-
sons, and John was arrested by the police.108  The Bennis car was seized and 
forfeited as a public nuisance under Michigan law.109  Since Michigan law did 
not provide for an innocent owner defense, Tina argued that the government’s 
seizure of her car, at least to the extent of her interest, violated her right to due 
process of law.110  On appeal from the grant of a forfeiture order, the Bennis 
Court upheld the forfeiture and ruled that that the Due Process Clause did not 
prevent a forfeiture of Tina’s legal interest in her car despite her innocence.111  
The Court found it to be significant that Michigan law authorized the initial 
seizure of the Bennis car and that state courts retained remedial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant a forfeiture.112  Apparently, the Bennis Court was not 
moved by the obvious fact that neither the prosecutor nor the trial court had 
exercised any discretion in favor of Tina Bennis.  Rather, the Bennis Court re-
treated behind the notion that civil forfeiture is “too firmly fixed in the coun-
try’s punitive and remedial jurisprudence to be now displaced.”113 
The Bennis decision was a shocking revelation, for it signaled that inno-
cence alone would not be enough to protect against the forfeiture of vital 
property.  Neither factual innocence nor the guarantees of due process of law 
saved Tina Bennis’ property from being forfeited to the government, leaving 
us with the nagging question of why Austin114 and the Excessive Fines Clause 
did not curb this abusive punishment. 
In fact, Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bennis questioned whether the Court’s 
holding was at odds with Austin, and he expressed concern that the forfeiture 
of Mrs. Bennis’ half interest in her car was an “excessive” punishment “out 
of all proportion to her blameworthiness.”115  Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court did not decide the Bennis case on Eighth Amendment grounds, and so 
the forfeiture stood. 
 
105 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
106  Id. at 443. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 443, 468. 
109 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 444. 
110 Id. at 445–46. 
111 Id. at 453. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 453. 
114 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
115 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 471 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). 
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The Bennis case highlights the importance of Austin’s application to civil 
forfeiture cases.  In Austin, the Court held that in rem civil forfeiture “consti-
tutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as such, is 
subject to . . . the [ ] Excessive Fines Clause.”116  The Austin case arose out of 
an in rem civil forfeiture action filed by the government against Richard Aus-
tin’s mobile home and auto body shop after he pleaded guilty to possessing 
cocaine with intent to sell.117  In the Supreme Court, Austin argued that the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem civil forfeiture 
proceedings.118  Ultimately, the Court agreed with Austin’s argument.  The 
Court rejected the government’s contention that in rem civil forfeiture was 
solely remedial in nature, concluding instead that “forfeiture generally, and 
statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at 
least in part, as punishment.”119  Having so concluded, the Court held that 
in rem civil forfeiture “constitutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for 
some offense,’ and, as such, is subject to . . . the [ ] Excessive Fines Clause.”120 
At this juncture, the Austin Court expressly declined to adopt a constitu-
tional “excessiveness” standard, instead leaving it to the lower courts “to con-
sider that question in the first instance.”121  However, the Court did 
acknowledge that a property’s relative instrumentality vel non to the underly-
ing offense might be a relevant factor in the excessiveness calculus.  Still, the 
Austin Court emphasized that its decision “in no way limit[ed] the Court of 
Appeals from considering other factors . . . .”122 
The Supreme Court’s next Excessive Fines Clause decision came five 
years later, in United States v. Bajakajian.123  Unlike Austin, which arose in a civil 
forfeiture context, Bajakajian arose out of a criminal forfeiture case.124  Hosep 
Bajakajian and his family had been preparing to board an international flight 
 
116 509 U.S. at 621–22 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
117 The Government alleged the following: (1) that Austin, while at his auto body shop, had agreed to 
sell cocaine to a certain buyer; (2) that Austin had gone to his mobile home to retrieve two grams 
of cocaine; and (3) that Austin had sold that cocaine to that buyer at the shop.  And alas, the buyer 
had been accompanied by a government informant throughout this time.  A search warrant exe-
cuted on both Austin’s shop and mobile home the recovered small amounts of marijuana and co-
caine, along with cash, drug paraphernalia, and a revolver.  Brief for Respondent-Appellate at 4–
5, Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
118 Austin, 509 U.S. at 606. 
119 Id. at 618. 
120 Id. at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265) (internal citation omitted). 
121 Id. at 622–23. 
122 Id. at 623 n.15.  On the same day that it decided Austin, the Supreme Court also decided Alexander 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993), a criminal forfeiture case in which the Court analyzed a de-
fendant’s punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Id. at 558–59.  In this case as well, the 
Court declined to announce a definitive test for determining constitutional excessiveness.  Id. at 
559. 
123 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
124 Id. at 325–27, 333. 
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at Los Angeles International Airport.125  In his luggage, Mr. Bajakajian car-
ried $357,144 in cash.126  Under federal law, any person transporting “more 
than $10,000” in money out of the United States “at one time” must report 
that fact to authorities.127  Mr. Bajakajian did not report that he had 
$357,144 in cash in his luggage, and so he was arrested and charged with 
willful failure to comply with this statutory reporting requirement.128  The 
government seized the $357,144 in cash in his luggage and sought forfeiture 
of the full amount.129  Here, “the Government . . . sought to punish [Mr. 
Bajakajian] by proceeding against him criminally, in personam, rather than 
proceeding in rem against the currency.”130  Therefore, forfeiture of the seized 
currency was predicated on Mr. Bajakajian’s criminal conviction for the re-
porting offense.  Mr. Bajakajian pleaded guilty to that offense, thereby trig-
gering a forfeiture of the entire $357,144 sum.131 
This then presented the case’s key question: “[W]hether forfeiture of the 
entire $357,144 that [Mr. Bajakajian] failed to declare would violate the Exces-
sive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”132  The Bajakajian Court “h[e]ld 
that it would, because full forfeiture of [Mr. Bajakajian’s] currency would be 
grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.”133  Bajakajian thus stands 
for the proposition that “a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause 
if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”134 
In the almost twenty years that have elapsed since Bajakajian, the Supreme 
Court has not provided additional guidance to lower courts on how they 
should apply the Excessive Fines Clause to in rem civil forfeitures.  Thus, it 
remains uncertain how courts should apply the Excessive Fines Clause to in 
rem forfeitures of family homes when the homeowner is not accused of or 
convicted of a crime.  In this uncertainty, some busy trial courts have been 
quick to set aside questions of instrumentality, culpability, or actual harm, 
and instead have reduced their constitutional inquiry to a narrow and rigid 
interpretation of Bajakajian—simply comparing the property’s monetary 
value to the maximum statutory fine authorized for the underlying crime.  If 
the amount of the property is less than the maximum authorized fine, these 
courts presume the forfeiture to be non-excessive and thus constitutional.  It 
is not a thoughtful process, and, worse yet, it disadvantages citizens of modest 
means who are most vulnerable, while protecting affluent owners who pos-
sess expensive homes. 
 
125 Id. at 324. 
126 Id. at 325. 
127 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (2012). 
128 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 333. 
131 Id. at 325–26. 
132 Id. at 324. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 334. 
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This is clearly not what the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to do.  
The experience of civil forfeiture at the grassroots level in Pennsylvania illus-
trates the dangers of such an overly rigid and misguided approach. 
V.  THE IMPACT OF CIVIL FORFEITURE ON THE GROUND 
For more than a decade, the Civil Practice Clinic at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School (“Penn Law Clinic”) has provided free legal repre-
sentation to indigent Philadelphia homeowners faced with civil forfeiture pe-
titions filed against their homes even though they were not accused or con-
victed of any wrongdoing.  We saw repeated patterns in these cases that 
revealed much about how civil forfeiture plays out in low-income, minority 
communities.  In many of these cases, the homeowners were older residents 
who were law-abiding citizens who had never committed a crime in their 
lives.  Many were retirees tending to personal challenges of poverty and ill-
health who agreed to take extended family members into their homes during 
tough economic times that hit minority communities especially hard. 
In many cases, we found that a homeowner’s adult son or grandson was 
arrested for low-level drug offenses, usually several sales of marijuana or 
crack cocaine for twenty dollars each to undercover agents and confidential 
informants.  Almost always, police initiated controlled buys by placing a 
phone call to the cell phone of the adult child or grandchild.  A confidential 
informant then arranged to meet the son or grandson at the front door of the 
home in which he resided (but did not own).  Almost without exception, po-
lice reports documenting their observations of the home and drug transac-
tions reported no involvement (or even physical presence) of the homeowner.  
It was clear that these transactions were hidden from the homeowner, 
providing additional evidence that the son or grandson knew that their par-
ents or grandparents would not approve of their drug involvement.  And, 
contrary to popular images sometimes conjured up by police or prosecutors, 
these homes certainly were not “crack houses.”  They were stable residences 
in impoverished communities where homeowners tried their best to watch 
over their property; there were no claims that strangers were coming and 
going from the home at all hours of the day or night. 
In several of these cases, prosecutors claimed that neighbors had de-
manded police action against drug activity at our clients’ homes.  In two such 
cases, we decided to investigate those claims.  Our students went to the resi-
dential blocks where the homeowners resided and surveyed neighbors.  In 
both cases, we found overwhelming support for the homeowners among the 
neighbors.  Our students talked with the neighbors on the block and obtained 
signatures from the great majority of them who willingly signed petitions ad-
dressed to the District Attorney’s office expressing their support for the 
homeowner.  With everyone’s permission, we delivered those petitions to the 
District Attorney’s office. 
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There were so many requests for free legal help in the high volume of 
civil forfeiture petitions filed against homes, cars, and cash in low-income 
Philadelphia communities that the Clinic decided to adopt a case acceptance 
policy that prioritized real estate.  With some exceptions, we used our limited 
resources primarily to help homeowners save their homes, since these cases 
appeared to have the greatest impact on the well-being of whole families and 
especially innocent young children.  We found that entire families were the 
“collateral damage” of harsh civil forfeiture policies that enabled the govern-
ment to seize homes for an adult child’s alleged transgression, and sometimes 
even for the actions of non-residents.135 
The Clinic handled scores of such cases over the past decade.  I want to 
describe two such cases that provide needed context for an examination of 
civil forfeiture.  These two cases are representative of patterns we saw with 
great frequency on the ground in low-income and minority communities 
when the government actively pursued family homes in civil forfeiture.136 
A.  Mary and Leon Adams’ Story 
Several years ago, a black husband and wife living in West Philadelphia 
came to the Penn Law Clinic after being served with a civil forfeiture petition 
filed by the Philadelphia D.A.’s office seeking to forfeit their home for three 
alleged $20 marijuana sales by their adult son.  Allegedly, one of those sales 
had occurred on the porch of their home.  Mary and Leon Adams were sixty-
eight and seventy years of age, respectively, and upright, law-abiding citizens; 
they had never been accused of, charged with, or convicted of any crime.  
Leon was a former steel plant worker; Mary was a retail saleswoman and 
former block captain in her neighborhood.  Their home was all paid up, and 
they now were retired, living on very modest means and financially eligible 
for free legal services under federal poverty guidelines. 
 
135 See e.g., MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INSTIT. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT 38 (1st ed. 
Mar. 2010), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf [hereinafter 
POLICING FOR PROFIT (1st ed.)] (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, Case ID: 010902903).  “Margaret 
Davis, a 77-year-old [black] homeowner with . . . end-stage renal disease, was in the habit of leaving 
her North Philadelphia home unlocked so her neighbors, who routinely checked up on her, could 
come and go.  She used paratransit to travel to dialysis treatment three times a week.”  Id.  In 
August 2001, police chased an alleged neighborhood drug dealer through Ms. Davis’s front door, 
through her house, and out the back.  Id.  Ms. Davis gave the police permission to search her home, 
and the police reported that they found a small quantity of drugs, “left in plain view, presumably 
[dropped] by the fleeing suspect[ ].”  Id.  Although Ms. Davis was not charged with any criminal 
offense, the D.A.’s Office filed a civil forfeiture petition against her home in September 2001.  Ms. 
Davis was indigent and came to the Penn Law Clinic in early 2002.  The Clinic undertook repre-
sentation and filed affirmative defenses to the forfeiture petition.  In November 2003, some twenty-
three months after the government’s filing, the D.A.’s office finally withdrew its forfeiture petition. 
136 See, e.g., POLICING FOR PROFIT (1st ed.), supra note 135, at 38. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Adams were very frightened about the prospect of losing 
their home in their senior years with nowhere to go.  They were also fright-
ened for their adult son who was now facing criminal charges for a drug of-
fense.  They did not know how they were going to help their son through this 
situation.  And they were especially frightened about the possibility of losing 
their home because Leon was battling pancreatic cancer, and they needed to 
spend a lot of their time and energy at the hospital and with his doctors.  
They did not know what to do and they did not understand how their home 
could be taken from them when they had not done anything wrong.137 
Pitted against the power of the state and too poor to afford a lawyer, Mary 
and Leon could have easily lost their home at a most vulnerable time in their 
lives.  However, they were more fortunate than many others.  They learned 
of the Penn Law Clinic and received free legal help.  Certified legal interns in 
the Clinic conducted interviews, filed pleadings, engaged in fact investigation 
and formal discovery, and entered into prolonged negotiations with the Dis-
trict Attorney’s office.  After more than a year of pre-trial litigation138 and only 
after substantial public exposure in the popular media,139 the Clinic obtained 
a court-approved agreement that saved their home from civil forfeiture. 
But many other Philadelphians are not so fortunate. 
B.  Elizabeth Young’s Story 
Like Mary and Leon Adams, Elizabeth Young is an elderly, black home-
owner in Philadelphia.  She purchased her West Philadelphia home in the 
1970s and worked for Amtrak for more than twenty-five years.140  She retired 
in 1995 and at age seventy, after her husband’s death, she remained in her 
West Philadelphia home while being active in her church and assisting the 
needy as a missionary.  Her health began to fail in later years and she pur-
chased a used Chevrolet Venture in 2006 to transport her to her medical 
appointments.141  Her health worsened in 2009 when she suffered blood clots 
in her lungs and was hospitalized for several weeks, requiring bed rest and 
several medications.142 
 
137 Mary and Leon’s story was featured in the New Yorker’s cover article, Taken, with their permission.  
Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2013/08/12/taken.  At first, Mary and Leon did not want to disclose their story to the public, 
but they ultimately decided they would do so if their plight could help others facing the same situ-
ation.  Id. 
138 Commonwealth v. 5937 Vine St., No. CP-51-MD-0008959-2012 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. Sept. 5, 
2012). 
139 See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.   
140 Forfeiture Hearing,, Commonwealth v. 416 S. 62nd St., No. CP–51–MD–0002972–2010, at 56–
57, 59 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. May 1, 2012); Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, No. CP–51–MD–
0013471–2010 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. May 1, 2012). 
141 Id. at 60, 72–73. 
142 Id. at 68. 
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At this time, Ms. Young’s adult son, Donald Graham, resided in her 
home along with two of Ms. Young’s grandchildren.  Donald was then nearly 
fifty years of age.  When he was a teenager he had a drug problem and was 
incarcerated.  Ms. Young had banned Donald from her home at that time, 
and they were estranged for many years.  But in later years as Donald ad-
vanced through middle age, he appeared to have turned his life around.  
Donald had children and was a responsible father.  When he needed a place 
to live, Ms. Young let Donald back in to her home and he proved quite help-
ful to her in her later years as her health problems worsened. 
After Ms. Young returned home from a hospital stay in the fall of 2009, 
and while on bed rest pursuant to doctor’s orders, police officers came to her 
home and informed her that they suspected that Donald was selling mariju-
ana.  She did not believe this to be true and asked the police for some proof 
of their suspicion.  They did not provide any evidence to her and they did 
not arrest Donald at that time.  Ms. Young did not see any drug involvement 
by her son and heard nothing further in 2009. 
However, in 2010 and again in 2011, Donald was arrested for several 
sales of small packets of marijuana for $20 each to confidential informants 
working with police narcotics agents.143  Each marijuana sale was initiated 
by the police with a phone call to Donald on his cell phone (not on a house 
phone), offering to buy marijuana and arranging to meet him at or near his 
residence.  The D.A.’s office prosecuted Donald for these drug offenses,144 
but then it did something more.  It brought a civil forfeiture petition against 
Ms. Young’s home and car, alleging that Ms. Young’s property facilitated 
Donald’s marijuana sales.  Ms. Young was not charged with a crime, and it 
is clear from police reports that officers never suspected her of any criminal 
wrongdoing.  Ms. Young was about to lose her home and her car at age 
seventy and while infirm for her adult son’s low-level marijuana sales, even 
though she earnestly believed (as she testified at trial) that he was not again 
involved with drugs. 
Unlike the Adams case, the D.A.’s office was unwilling to resolve Ms. 
Young’s case amicably.  Ms. Young was fortunate to obtain pro bono legal help 
from a large Philadelphia law firm that had previously worked with the Clinic 
on civil forfeiture cases.  At trial, Ms. Young contended that she was an in-
nocent owner because she neither knew nor consented to any drug activity 
by her fifty-year-old son.  She also argued that the government’s taking of 
her home and car for her son’s marijuana sales violated the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 
 
143 Id. at 16–22. 
144 This prosecution resulted in Donald’s incarceration, but no fine (other than standard court costs) 
was imposed on him.  Commonwealth v. Graham, No. CP-51-CR-0000643-2010 (Ct. C.P. Phila. 
Cty. Sept. 15, 2010). 
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The trial judge rejected Ms. Young’s innocent owner defense, instead 
adopting the prosecutor’s claim that Ms. Young had turned a blind eye to her 
son’s drug activity and that such negligence, however minor, justified the 
taking her home and car.  The trial judge was not persuaded by affidavit 
testimony from a close neighbor verifying that Ms. Young had been a good 
neighbor and community resident, and that the neighbor had never observed 
any drug activity at Ms. Young’s house. 
The trial court also rejected Ms. Young’s “excessive fines” defense, rea-
soning that forfeitures of both Ms. Young’s home and car were not grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of Donald’s marijuana offenses.  To reach this 
conclusion, the trial court simply compared the maximum statutory fine for 
Donald’s criminal conduct (at least $80,000) to the market value of Ms. 
Young’s home (approximately $54,000). 
At age seventy and innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, Ms. Young 
found that her own government had snatched away her home and car and 
threw her and her grandchildren on the street.  Claims of a statutory inno-
cent owner defense and a constitutional excessive fines defense, and even le-
gal representation from a large law firm, were not enough to save Ms. Young 
and her grandchildren from being thrown out on the street by the govern-
ment.  The most vital belongings of Ms. Young and her family were handed 
over to the D.A.’s office, even though Donald was separately prosecuted and 
punished for his minor drug offenses.  While the prosecutor’s office retained 
discretion not to take Ms. Young’s home and car, especially because Donald 
was already incarcerated for his marijuana sales, it refused to exercise that 
discretion in Ms. Young’s favor.  This is what civil forfeiture means in poor 
and minority neighborhoods, where abuse of this extraordinary power plays 
out with disturbing frequency. 
Ms. Young’s case resembles many other civil forfeiture actions in pro-
found ways.  The government sought to forfeit a family home based not upon 
any criminal conduct of the homeowner, but rather based upon low-level 
drug offenses by a third party (most often an adult child or grandchild).  The 
case involved several “controlled buys” of small amounts of marijuana.  Each 
drug exchange was initiated by the police, and in each case, a narcotics agent 
called the third party (here, Donald) on his cell phone (not on a house phone), 
offering to buy a controlled substance and arranging to meet that person at 
or near his residence.  On the third controlled buy, the police arrested the 
third party, searched the property and sometimes found additional drugs, 
often hidden in that person’s bedroom.  The Penn Law Clinic has helped 
scores of low-income homeowners over the past decade and their stories are 
remarkably similar.145 
 
145 One example is the case of Anna (fictitious name), a middle-aged, Hispanic single mother, and a 
hard working health care worker employed outside of her home.  Police seized and sealed Anna’s 
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On the other hand, Ms. Young’s case also differs in some ways from many 
other cases.  Most Philadelphia civil forfeiture cases end up in default judg-
ments in favor of the government or in settlements that place conditions on 
the homeowners.  Here, Ms. Young’s case went to trial and she had pro bono 
counsel at her side to represent her and to present her defenses.  When for-
feiture was nonetheless granted by the trial court, Ms. Young appealed to the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania with the assistance of her pro bono 
lawyers.  After briefing and oral argument before the appellate court sitting 
en banc, Ms. Young obtained a favorable decision overturning the trial court’s 
ruling.  However, years later, Ms. Young is still in legal limbo and not in 
possession of her home or car as the prosecutor’s office sought and obtained 
further review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.146   
In civil forfeiture cases, weak statutory protections are wholly inadequate 
to protect private property from government overreaching, especially where 
powerful financial incentives drive aggressive forfeiture practices.  If family 
homes of the innocent are to be saved from civil forfeiture, a strongly en-
forced Excessive Fines Clause will need to do the heavy lifting. 
VI.  WHOSE PROPERTY IS IT, ANYWAY? 
At this point, we need to ask just whose property is caught up in the civil 
forfeiture web?  Are harsh civil forfeiture laws applied evenly across racial 
 
home under Pennsylvania’s civil forfeiture law, evicting her on the spot without any advance notice 
or opportunity to be heard. The seizure was based upon low-level drug sales allegedly committed 
by her adult son and her son’s friend (who was temporarily living with them).  Anna had agreed to 
allow her son’s friend to live in her home because he had nowhere else to go.  Upon seizure, Anna’s 
clothes and household belongings were locked up in her home.  She was excluded from her home 
for two months, forced to live temporarily with her sister in overcrowded conditions. 
  Anna had committed no crime, was never charged with a crime, and was not even suspected by 
police of any wrongdoing.  Indeed, she had never been convicted of a drug offense in her life.  With 
the Clinic’s help, Anna filed a court motion to be restored to her home.  Even after the filing, the 
D.A.’s Office refused to allow her to return to her home.  The court held a full evidentiary hearing, 
after which it ordered that Anna be returned to her home.  Though some measure of justice was 
ultimately obtained for her, it took two months and full legal proceedings just to get her back into 
her home.  While the Clinic’s cases largely involve home forfeitures, civil forfeiture focuses largely 
on cash and cars.  In one Clinic case, the police confiscated the piggy bank belonging to our client’s 
young daughter when they searched the client’s home as a result of a third party’s alleged drug 
offense.  The piggy bank contained the young girl’s birthday money totaling $91.  Neither mother 
nor daughter was ever charged with any criminal wrongdoing, but it still took over twelve months 
and many court appearances (with counsel) before our client was able to get her daughter’s piggy 
bank money returned. 
146  On May 25, 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued a 73 page, unanimous decision 
affirming the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanding the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. The remand hearing has not yet been 
scheduled as of the writing of this article.  Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet and Contents 
Seized from James Young [Elizabeth Young], 29 EAP 2015 (May 25, 2017) and Common-
wealth v. The Real Property and Improvements Known as 416 S. 62nd Street, Philadelphia, 
PA 19143 [Elizabeth Young], 30 EAP 2015 (May 25, 2017); Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevro-
let, 106 A.3d 836 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), appeal granted, 120 A.3d 993 (Pa. 2015).  
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groups and income levels?  Do troubling concerns of disproportionality in 
our criminal justice system also apply to government’s pursuit of civil forfei-
ture?147 
We live in a time of Big Data when it is relatively easy to capture, record, 
and analyze large amounts of statistical information.  To answer such ques-
tions, we should have easy access to a full range of demographic and default 
judgment statistics compiled by government authorities.  Both law enforce-
ment agencies and courts are well situated to know the demographics of those 
whose property is seized through civil forfeiture and the extent to which de-
fault judgments deprive property owners of their day in court.  Despite the 
huge amounts of money that civil forfeiture amasses on both national and 
state levels, legislators have inexplicably failed to require that such essential 
information be reported to them and to the public. 
Pennsylvania is typical of most states in requiring that the state attorney 
general and local district attorney’s offices report annually the amount of 
homes, cars, and currency they forfeit and the total income generated from 
forfeiture proceeds.  Yet, these are only summary reports; they do not pro-
vide the data necessary to answer whether civil forfeiture is being applied 
fairly to all citizens and communities.148  Such information is not mandated 
by civil forfeiture laws, and it is revealing that law enforcement agencies do 
not voluntarily compile or disclose this information. 
In Philadelphia County, official civil forfeiture reports provided by the 
local district attorney’s office reveal that over a period of nine fiscal years 
(2005–2014), the Philadelphia D.A.’s office took in to its budget $34.2 million 
in forfeited cash, 1,938 forfeited vehicles, and 746 forfeited homes, for a total 
of $47.7 million in forfeited proceeds.  Despite the magnitude of these num-
bers, the government’s reports are silent about whose property was taken or 
whether property confiscation was applied fairly across racially and econom-
ically diverse communities.  With such huge profits flowing to law enforce-
ment agencies from confiscated property, it is hard to understand why legis-
lators have not demanded to know whose constituents are most at risk in civil 
forfeiture. 
There does not appear to be a single government study examining the 
race and income levels of homeowners who have lost their homes to civil 
forfeiture.  Nor does there appear to be a government report analyzing 
whether the practice of seizing family homes from homeowners who are not 
 
147 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing—inter alia—(1) that legislators have incentivized police drug 
arrests through asset forfeiture laws that allow prosecutors to keep the proceeds from seizures; and 
(2) that police fight the War on Drugs in predominantly black and Latino communities, independ-
ent of the prevalence of drug use among whites). 
148 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6802(i)–(j) (2006). 
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charged with a crime makes communities safer or, conversely, whether it de-
stabilizes fragile communities and undermines public safety.149 
With such strong profit motives built into civil forfeiture laws, there is no 
satisfactory justification for not requiring answers to these fundamental ques-
tions from law enforcement authorities.  The public should know whether 
aggressive civil forfeiture practices are applied fairly to all segments of the 
population or whether the most vulnerable members of our society dispro-
portionately shoulder the burden of such harsh laws.  A research study pub-
lished ten years ago concluded that civil forfeiture petitions were brought 
more often in communities with a high proportion of African-American res-
idents and in communities with a high degree of economic inequality.150  
More recent studies conducted by both non-profit organizations and investi-
gative journalists have produced similarly disturbing results. 
The ACLU of Pennsylvania has taken a close look at Pennsylvania civil 
forfeiture practices.  After a months-long investigation in Philadelphia, in 
which the ACLU obtained public records and examined court files, the 
ACLU gathered summary data on every civil forfeiture case filed in Phila-
delphia in recent years and obtained in-depth information on a randomized 
sample of over 350 cash forfeiture cases from 2011 to 2013.151  In addition, 
the organization interviewed property owners to learn more about their per-
sonal experiences with civil forfeiture. 
The findings of the ACLU study present cause for concern.  In particular, 
the ACLU study noted pronounced disparities resulting from civil forfeiture 
practices in Philadelphia: 
[T]he racial composition of the group of Philadelphians affected by forfeiture 
laws is similar to the racial composition of the people arrested for forfeitable of-
fenses in Philadelphia; African-Americans comprise approximately 60% of both 
groups.  But experts have suggested that Philadelphia’s high rate of arrest for 
black people results from racial bias in policing.  This raises the question of 
whether law enforcement bias (either conscious or unconscious) is similarly re-
sponsible for the racial disparity in Philadelphia’s enforcement of civil asset for-
feiture laws.  There are even more pronounced disparities among cash forfeitures 
 
149 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
150 Research by two social scientists found that civil asset forfeiture claims were brought more often in 
communities with a high proportion of African-American residents.  Robert Helms & S.E. Cos-
tanza, Race, Politics, & Drug Law Enforcement: An Analysis of Civil Asset Forfeiture Patterns across US Counties, 
19 POLICING & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2007).  Further, they found that civil asset forfeiture is more likely to 
occur in communities with a high degree of economic inequality.  Id. at 13–14.  Additionally, a 
prior report from the Drug Policy Foundation found that civil asset forfeiture has a disproportion-
ate impact on racial minorities and the poor; the report also explained that Seattle’s drug nuisance 
abatement program, which used civil forfeiture to seize buildings suspected of being involved in 
drug dealing, targeted property owned by racial minorities in 96% of cases.  See SCOTT EHLERS, 
POLICY BRIEFING: ASSET FORFEITURE 9 (1999), http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/As-
set_Forfeiture_Briefing.pdf (noting that only one of the twenty-eight drug abatement cases in Se-
attle involved a white property owner). 
151 ACLU OF PA., GUILTY PROPERTY, supra note 99, at 10. 
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without supporting convictions.  An estimated 7 out of 10 people whose cash is 
taken by Philadelphia law enforcement agencies even though they have not been 
convicted of a crime are African-American.152 
The ACLU study also examined civil forfeiture enforcement in other 
Pennsylvania counties.  In Montgomery County, a suburban county located 
outside of Philadelphia, only 9% of the population is black, yet black people 
made up 37% of those arrested for forfeitable offenses and 53% of property 
owners facing forfeiture.153  In Cumberland County, located in south-central 
Pennsylvania, only 3% of the population is black, but black people make up 
15% of those arrested for forfeitable offenses and 36% of property owners 
targeted for forfeiture.154  According to the ACLU, it appears that in Cum-
berland County black people are eighteen times more likely to be the targets 
of civil forfeiture than are people of other races.155 
The ACLU study also raised troubling concerns about one-sided out-
comes in civil forfeiture cases.  From 2012 to 2014, 92% of the 1,502 forfei-
ture actions filed against individual property owners in Montgomery County 
ended in the government’s favor, 7.7% ended in a settlement or partial for-
feiture, and only 0.3% resulted in favor of the property owner.156  Montgom-
ery County property owners were three times less likely to successfully defend 
their case than Philadelphia County property owners.157 
The Center for American Progress (“Center”), a non-profit organization 
located in Washington, D.C., has also conducted research on civil forfeiture 
practices.  In a recently published report, the Center noted that “[w]hile 
available data on the populations affected by civil asset forfeiture are limited, 
an array of analyses conducted by media outlets and advocacy organizations 
suggests that people of color are disproportionately impacted by civil asset 
forfeiture.”158  The report referred to civil asset forfeiture as “the new stop 
and frisk.”159  It cited a 2014 analysis by the Washington Post that examined 
400 court cases across 17 states which found that, “where people . . . chal-
lenged seizures and received some money back, the majority were black, His-
panic, or another minority.”160  While the Post’s analysis examined only cases 
where property owners successfully challenged forfeitures, people of color 
appear to bear the brunt of civil asset forfeiture—whether they challenge it 
 
152 Id. 
153 ACLU OF PA., BROKEN JUSTICE, supra note 89, at 6, 8 n.22.   
154 ACLU OF PA., FORFEITURE IN THE SHADOWS: AN INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE IN CUMBERLAND COUNTY 5, 8 n.24 (2015), 
https://www.aclupa.org/files/2114/5010/9994/CumberlandCounty_Forfeiture_Report-Fi-
nal.pdf. 
155 Id. at 5–6, 8 n.25. 
156 ACLU OF PA., BROKEN JUSTICE, supra note 89, at 3–4. 
157 Id. 
158 FORFEITING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 67, at 5. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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or not—in states and cities across the United States, according to the Cen-
ter’s findings.  For example, the report cited an Oklahoma study examining 
401 cash seizures made between 2010 and 2015 in ten Oklahoma counties 
that found that nearly two-thirds of seizures came from African Americans, 
Latinos, and other racial and ethnic minorities, even though 75% of the 
state’s population is white.161 
The Center also expressed concern that cash forfeitures keep low-income 
families from getting ahead and can actually drive them deeper into poverty.  
The Center’s report suggested that low-income and minority communities 
may be particularly hard-hit by civil forfeiture because they are more likely 
to be disconnected from the financial mainstream, leaving their residents 
more likely to carry cash.162  Low-income and minority residents are espe-
cially likely to operate outside the financial mainstream: As of 2013, nearly 
half of all black and Latino households were unbanked or underbanked com-
pared with one in five white households.163  Because unbanked and un-
derbanked individuals are often forced to carry relatively large sums of 
cash—such as a full month’s rent payment or wages from an entire pay pe-
riod—they can be especially vulnerable to civil forfeitures of cash. 
The Center’s report also expressed concern that low-income individuals 
may face special barriers to challenging governmental seizures.164  The cost 
of taking off from work to appear in court on multiple occasions can be too 
costly for individuals living paycheck to paycheck, and their absence from 
work may even threaten their continued employment.  The Center reported 
that on average, a property owner facing civil forfeiture must spend four days 
in court to challenge the seizure of his or her property, and this can have a 
devastating impact upon low-wage workers.165 
Finally, the Center reported that while cash seizures make up the vast 
majority of civil forfeiture cases, the seizure of cars and homes can be even 
more devastating to low-income individuals.  The Center cited an analysis 
by the Institute for Justice that found that Texas and Virginia seized more 
 
161 Id.  The Center’s report also cited the data and analysis from the ACLU’s “Guilty Property” report.  
ACLU OF PA., GUILTY PROPERTY, supra note 99. 
162 See FORFEITING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 67, at 6 (“In 2013, the most recent year for 
which data are available, 17 million Americans were unbanked—meaning they did not have a 
bank account—and 51 million Americans were underbanked—meaning they had a bank account 
but still utilized alternative financial providers, such as pawn shops or check cashers.  Half of all 
households with income of less than $15,000 were either unbanked or underbanked.”) (endnotes 
omitted). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. (“For a minimum-wage worker, the cost of taking off work for four days is $232—and that 
is if the worker’s employer will permit time off, a luxury many low-wage workers do not have.  
There is also the cost of hiring an attorney to help navigate the complex laws—an expense that 
most low-income individuals cannot afford—leaving many without legal representation given the 
scarcity of civil legal aid and other free or low-cost legal services.”) (endnotes omitted). 
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than 17,000 vehicles between 2001 and 2007.166  The average value of seized 
vehicles was less than $6,000, which strongly suggests that low-income people 
are most affected in those states.167 
The Penn Law Clinic has provided free representation to low-income 
property owners in Philadelphia civil forfeiture cases for almost fifteen years.  
In the Clinic’s experience over this lengthy time, clients caught up in civil 
forfeiture are overwhelmingly black and, to a lesser degree, Latino.  This 
conclusion is based upon a review of the clients who sought legal assistance 
from the Clinic as well as regular observations of property owners awaiting 
the call of their cases in Philadelphia’s dedicated, full-time civil forfeiture 
courtroom.  This same conclusion was also reported by an investigative jour-
nalist studying Philadelphia civil forfeiture practices.168  Based upon these 
observations, the Penn Law Clinic decided to take a closer look at available 
data to determine if actual court filings confirmed these observations.169 
The Penn Law Clinic obtained data on every real estate forfeiture petition 
filed by the Philadelphia D.A.’s office during calendar year 2010.  This data 
showed that the D.A.’s office filed 479 real estate civil forfeitures in that cal-
endar year.170  Excluding commercial properties, we charted the official as-
sessed value and geographical location of each of the 452 homes against which 
a civil forfeiture petition was filed in that year.  The results were troubling. 
We learned that the mean assessed value of all residential properties in 
2010 was only $23,174.34.171  The median value was even lower at 
$18,550.00, meaning that half of all homes against which civil forfeiture ac-
tions were filed had an official assessed value of under $18,550.00.172  Per-
haps, most revealing, we learned that 75% of all homes in civil forfeiture had 
an official assessed value of $29,900 or less.173  These low-assessed values 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 7, 21 n.40 (citing POLICING FOR PROFIT (1st ed.), supra note 135, at 29). 
168 See Thompson, The Cash Machine, supra note 80 (“The majority of those affected [by civil forfei-
ture] . . . [are] generally black or Hispanic, working-class and poor.”). 
169 Pennsylvania’s civil forfeiture laws provide limited transparency to the public, mandating only that 
prosecutors provide annual reports with summary information about the types of forfeited property 
and forfeiture revenues.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6802(i)–(j) (2006). 
170 Brief of Amici Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Community Legal Ser-
vices, Philadelphia NAACP, Philadelphia Legal Assistance, Philadelphia Volunteers for the Indi-
gent Program, and SeniorLaw Center at Exhibit C, D, Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 2017 
WL 2291733 (Pa. Mar. 23, 2016) (No. 29 EAP 2015, No. 30 EAP 2015) [hereinafter ACLU-PA 
Young Amicus Brief]. 
171  ACLU-PA Young Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at Exhibit D.    
172 Id. 
173 See infra Appendix (ex. A.4).  Because average property values are reported by ward, median values 
for the City are not available.  Between 2010 and 2015 the City of Philadelphia engaged in an 
actual value initiative (“AVI”), which consisted of a reassessment of the value of properties in the 
city.  In 2015 terms, the median value of homes against which forfeitures were brought in 2010 
was $61,250.  See infra Appendix (exs. A.3, A.4).  Still, over half of the homes against which forfeiture 
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confirm the Penn Law Clinic’s experience and observations that civil forfei-
ture actions are overwhelmingly brought against Philadelphia homes owned 
by families of very modest means who lack the financial resources to pay for 
legal representation. 
The Penn Law Clinic also mapped out the physical location of each of 
the 452 real estate civil forfeitures filed in calendar year 2010 (excluding com-
mercial properties) to determine which communities were most affected by 
civil forfeiture.  We used PolicyMap,174 a geographical mapping software pro-
gram that integrates official census data and related demographic infor-
mation into the mapping program.  Using this software, we generated a map 
of the City of Philadelphia containing a pinpoint for every civil forfeiture 
action filed against a Philadelphia home in 2010.  This map, displayed in the 
Appendix to this Article (as Exhibit A.1), demonstrates that civil forfeiture 
petitions filed against homes are overwhelmingly concentrated in those areas 
of the City that have the highest concentrations of non-white residents.175 
Race-based disparity came into even sharper focus in a close-up mapping 
and analysis of the expanded Center City area of Philadelphia.176  The ex-
panded central area of the City has a high white population, in contrast to 
neighborhoods directly to the north and west of Center City.  In this ex-
panded central part of the city, the D.A’s office filed only one civil forfeiture 
petition out of a total of 452 petitions filed against homes in 2010.177  Upon 
review of that one petition, we confirmed that this home belonged to a black 
family.178  Significantly, not a single forfeiture petition was brought against a 
white family’s home in the heavily populated Greater Center City area of 
Philadelphia.  This race-skewed result is difficult to explain because we know 
that drug activity occurs in this heavily populated area of the City and, in 
fact, police records document an average of around 464 drug-related inci-
dents annually in the Greater Center City Area.179  In short, while drug ac-
tivity definitely occurs in this largely white residential area of the City, there 
 
petitions were filed were valued at less than $80,000—the amount of the maximum authorized 
fines in Ms. Young’s case. 
174 POLICYMAP, https://www.policymap.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
175 See infra Appendix (ex. A.1). 
176 See infra Appendix (ex. A.2).  For this purpose, the expanded central part of the City was defined as 
the area from the Delaware River to 44th Street and Powelton Avenue in the West and from 
Washington Avenue in the South to Fairmount Avenue in the North.  Id. 
177  ACLU-PA Young Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 30. 
178 2305 Montrose Street is located in one of the few remaining predominately non-white areas of the 
central part of the City and was owned by a black family.  Id.  The race of the family was determined 
from a review of publicly-available criminal records of underlying and related criminal offenses of 
family members which contained race information. 
179 This data was discovered by obtaining a letter and CD from the Open Records Officer of the 
Philadelphia Police Department on April 8, 2016, which contained Part II crime data regarding 
non-violent offenses, including drug offenses from the years 2012-2014 to calculate an approximate 
annual average.  Crime Incidents, PHILA.GOV, http://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-in-
cidents (last visited May 10, 2017). 
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was not a single civil forfeiture petition filed against the home of a white fam-
ily in all of 2010.180 
Notably, our review utilizing PolicyMap software also revealed that the 
vast majority of real estate forfeitures filed by Philadelphia prosecutors in 
2010 were brought against families in the City’s lowest income bracket—
those making less than $41,114 per year.181  In short, the graphic mapping 
of 2010 civil forfeiture petitions demonstrates that Philadelphia prosecutors 
disproportionately filed civil forfeiture petitions against low-income families 
of color.  These families largely lack the financial resources needed to hire a 
lawyer and frequently must proceed on their own if they wish to defend 
against civil forfeiture petitions brought to take away their homes. 
These studies do not answer the question of what, if anything, happens 
to the property of affluent whites when we know that serious drug activity 
has occurred at their homes.  While we are unaware of any empirical study 
that addresses this question, three prominent Pennsylvania drug cases are 
highly instructive and suggest that the homes of affluent whites are likely to 
escape civil forfeiture. 
The clearest example of disparate treatment involved the expensive home 
of Andy Reid, a former head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles.182  Andy Reid 
struggled as many parents do with his sons’ drug problems.  His two adult 
sons were arrested and convicted of serious drug charges while residing in 
Andy Reid’s suburban Philadelphia home.183  Police searched his home 
where they found illegal drugs, prescription pills, weapons, and ammunition.  
One of Reid’s sons admitted in a probation report that he sold drugs to his 
friends and their parents in the suburbs and in tough areas of Philadelphia, 
and that he liked being a drug dealer.184  At a hearing for one of Reid’s sons, 
the sentencing judge said that Andy Reid’s family was “in crisis” and de-
scribed his home as a “drug emporium . . . with drugs all over the house.”185 
Despite the pervasiveness of illegal drugs in the Reid home, and despite 
the fact that some of the charges—carrying a firearm without a license, hit-
ting another driver while driving under the influence—carried overtones of 
 
180 According to reported studies, while marijuana is used at roughly comparable rates by white and 
black people, a black Pennsylvanian is 5.19 times more likely than a white Pennsylvanian to be 
arrested for marijuana possession.  See, e.g., ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE 18 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-
rfs-rel1.pdf. 
181 ACLU-PA Young Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 37. 
182 See Gary Myers, Judge Calls Andy Reid Home a Drug Den, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 2, 2007, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/judge-calls-andy-reid-home-drug-den-article-
1.256416. 
183 ACLU-PA Young Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 33. 
184 Id. at 33–34. 
185 Reid Brothers Receive Jail Terms; Judge Cites ‘Family in Crisis’, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2007), 
http://espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=3089753. 
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violence, the Reid home was never seized in a civil forfeiture proceeding for 
the serious and undisputed drug offenses committed by his sons.186 
A second incident involved suburban high school students residing on 
Philadelphia’s affluent mainline.  According to published reports, Neil Scott 
and Timothy Brooks—both graduates of the prestigious Haverford School—
started a drug trafficking operation based in the affluent Main Line sub-
urbs.187  Their operation had connections at Lower Merion High School, 
Radnor High School, Harriton High School, and, eventually, Haverford 
College.  The operation was highly profitable, earning each partner several 
thousand dollars per week.188  Both ringleaders regularly had packages of 
marijuana delivered to their homes.  They were arrested in 2014, but despite 
a direct connection between drug activity and their homes, civil forfeiture 
petitions were not filed against the homes in which Neil Scott and Timothy 
Brooks resided.189 
This is not to suggest that civil forfeiture petitions are never brought 
against white, affluent individuals.  According to police reports, Philadelphia 
pediatrician Jan Widerman and his wife, Annette, were arrested in February 
2016 after police discovered a marijuana growing operation at their home in 
suburban Bucks County, Pennsylvania.190  They were charged with felony 
and misdemeanor drug offenses.191  Apparently, police and firefighters had 
responded to Dr. Widerman’s home for a car fire that had spread to his gar-
age.  “As crews extinguished the flames and searched inside the home for 
occupants, they found 40 marijuana plants in various stages of 
growth . . . . along with grow lamps and ventilation systems . . . .”192 
In May 2016, the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office filed a civil 
forfeiture petition in connection with its criminal prosecution of the 
 
186 ACLU-PA Young Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 34. 
187 Simon Van Zuylen-Wood, The Fall of the Main Line Drug Ring, PHILA. MAGAZINE (July 27, 2014), 
http://www.phillymag.com/articles/fall-main-line-drug-ring-high-hopes/. 
188 Id. 
189 Id.  Our research through multiple databases did not reveal any civil forfeiture petition filed against 
either home of Neil Scott or Timothy Brooks.  As of the writing of this article, it appears that the 
statute of limitations has expired for the filing of a civil forfeiture petition.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 5524(5) (2004) (providing a two-year limitation period for “[a]n action upon a statute for a civil 
penalty or forfeiture”). 
190 Anastasia Weckerly & David Chang, Philadelphia Pediatrician Arrested for Pot Growing Operation: Police, 
NBC 10 PHILA. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Philadelphia-Pot-
Growing-Pediatrician-in-Court--374160561.html [hereinafter Weckerly & Chang, Philadelphia Pe-
diatrician Arrested]. 
191 See Commonwealth v. Widerman, No. CP-09-CR-0005432-2016 (Ct. C.P. Bucks Cty. Aug. 18, 
2016) (showing the docket for criminal proceedings against Jan Widerman); Commonwealth v. 
Widerman, No. CP-09-CR-0005433-2016 (Ct. C.P. Bucks Cty. Aug. 18, 2016) (noting the docket 
for criminal proceedings against Annette Widerman). 
192 Weckerly & Chang, Philadelphia Pediatrician Arrested, supra note 190. 
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Widermans.193  Significantly, however, this forfeiture petition did not target 
the Widerman home—the key instrument of the Widermans’ alleged mari-
juana growing operation.  Rather, the D.A.’s Office sought forfeiture of 
$16,410.82 in cash and three silver troy ounce coins, which the police alleged 
were in Dr. Widerman’s possession at the time of his illegal drug activity.194  
In sharp contrast to the government’s aggressive pursuit of the homes of mi-
norities for their adult children’s minor marijuana exchanges which, at best, 
are tangentially connected to their homes, the government chose not to seek 
civil forfeiture of the Widerman home even when it was the situs of a large 
marijuana growing operation carried on by the homeowners.  The difference 
in treatment is disturbing. 
These three examples underscore the importance of knowing just whose 
homes are at risk in civil forfeiture.  They suggest troubling questions of se-
lective enforcement that adversely affects low-income homeowners and peo-
ple of color.  We need to know whether white homeowners escape civil for-
feiture prosecution under similar (or more serious) circumstances.  As heroin 
moves increasingly to white, affluent suburbs,195 it will be telling whether the 
government’s use of civil forfeiture against family homes follows this migra-
tion of drug activity. 
The lesson to be learned from these preliminary studies is clear: When 
governmental power is tilted so heavily in its favor and the law does not pro-
vide a right to counsel to those who are most vulnerable, vigorous judicial 
enforcement of constitutional protections is essential.  If prosecutors are in-
tent on seeking the forfeiture of homes owned by low-income and vulnerable 
homeowners who have not committed a crime, and legislators are unwilling 
to enact meaningful reforms that balance the scales of justice, courts must 
step up to curb abusive punishments.  The Excessive Fines Clause cannot be 
an illusory promise in the dangerous world of civil forfeiture. 
VII.  WEAK STATUTORY PROTECTIONS DEMAND STRONG 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
Although a few states have recently adopted statutory reforms,196 vulner-
able property owners must be able to invoke state and federal constitutional 
 
193 See In re Jan Widerman, No. CP-09-MD-1179-2016 (Ct. C.P. Bucks Cty. May 5, 2016).  Both the 
criminal and civil forfeiture matters are still in litigation at the time of the writing of this Article.  
See id. (listing the case status as “active”); Commonwealth v. Widerman, No. CP-09-CR-0005432-
2016 (Ct. C.P. Bucks Cty. Aug. 18, 2016) (noting the same “active” status). 
194 Id. 
195 60 Minutes: Heroin in the Heartland (CBS television broadcast Nov. 1, 2016). 
196 A few states have adopted civil forfeiture reforms.  For example, Minnesota, New Mexico, and 
Montana each have enacted legislation providing that the government may not take private prop-
erty in civil forfeiture unless the property owner has been criminally convicted of the offense on 
which the forfeiture is predicated.  MINN. STAT. § 609.531, subdiv. 6a(b)(1) (2016); N.M. STAT. 
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protections as a final line of defense against abusive punishments.  Weak stat-
utory protections in most civil forfeiture laws, coupled with disturbing evi-
dence of disproportionate enforcement, demand that courts diligently en-
force constitutional protections against excessive fines. 
When the Supreme Court held in Austin that the Excessive Fines Clause 
applies to statutory in rem civil forfeiture, it found that forfeited property must 
be instrumental to the commission of the underlying criminal offense.197  
Apart from this “instrumentality” requirement, the Austin Court left the ini-
tial development of a multi-factor “excessiveness” test to the lower courts.198  
However, before lower courts were able to develop such a test, the Supreme 
Court announced a proportionality test in Bajakajian when applying the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause to in personam criminal forfeitures. 
The Bajakajian Court directed that courts should “compare the amount 
of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant’s offense” to determine if it 
was grossly disproportional and thus unconstitutional.199  While acknowledg-
ing that this determination was “inherently imprecise,” the Bajakajian Court 
identified several relevant, non-exclusive factors for courts to consider; to 
wit—the maximum authorized penalty for the defendant’s offense, the pen-
alty actually imposed; whether the offense was isolated; and the harm result-
ing from the offense.200  These factors were tailored to the criminal forfeiture 
context where the forfeiture of private property is predicated upon the prop-
erty owner’s conviction of the predicate offense(s). 
Prosecutors have attempted to apply strictly Bajakajian’s proportionality 
test to both criminal and civil forfeitures.  Of course, a civil forfeiture action 
is very different.  Civil forfeiture is an in rem action that proceeds on the legal 
fiction of “guilty” property—that certain property has done wrong by facili-
tating criminal activity.  Civil forfeiture is not predicated upon the property 
owner’s guilt; indeed, the property owner need not be charged with a crimi-
nal offense.  And in many cases the property owner is not the person accused 
of criminal wrongdoing.  Nonetheless, prosecutors still argue that the “exces-
siveness” vel non of a civil forfeiture should be determined simply by compar-
ing the property’s value to the maximum statutory fine for the alleged under-
lying offense. 
 
ANN. § 31-27-4 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-206–213 (West 2015).  In addition, the New 
Mexico law directs all “forfeited currency and all . . . proceeds [from] the sale of forfeited . . . prop-
erty” into a general fund—rather than to law enforcement—and prohibits equitable sharing.  N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-7–11 (2015). 
197 Austin, 509 U.S. at 621. 
198 Id. at 622–623, 623 n.15. 
199 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336–37. 
200 Id. at 339. 
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Here, Ms. Young’s case illustrates the danger of rigidly applying Ba-
jakajian’s proportionality test, meant for criminal forfeitures, to the civil for-
feiture of a home and car.  At trial, Ms. Young’s lawyer argued that the for-
feiture of her home and car for low-level marijuana sales by her adult son, 
Donald, would constitute an excessive fine.  The trial court made a cursory 
assessment of “the gravity of the [underlying] offense” and agreed with the 
prosecutor that Donald “theoretically could have faced criminal penalties of 
$80,000 for making four sales of marijuana in December 2009 and January 
2010.”201  The Court then mechanically compared this maximum author-
ized fine to the fair market value of Ms. Young’s home, approximately 
$54,000 (based on evidence presented).  The prosecutor argued at trial that 
the proposed forfeiture was not “excessive” because the value of Ms. Young’s 
home fell below the maximum fine that could have been imposed against 
Donald.  The prosecutor did not offer, and the trial court did not require, 
any evidence of the actual fine imposed against Donald for these several ma-
rijuana sales.202  Nor did the prosecutor offer any evidence of specific harm 
from the controlled marijuana buys initiated by police and confidential in-
formants.  Instead, the prosecutor argued that the trial court should infer 
generalized harm because drug activity has undesirable social consequences 
and jeopardizes the safety of neighbors and police officers.203  The trial court 
adopted the prosecutor’s arguments and ruled that the forfeiture of Ms. 
Young’s home and car was not an excessive fine for her son’s marijuana 
sales.204 
In many (if not most) Pennsylvania civil forfeiture cases, an excessive fines 
defense is not raised at all because the property owner lacks counsel and is 
unaware of this constitutional defense.  Neither the prosecutor nor the trial 
court inform the property owner of this defense and a notice of this right is 
not required by statute.  While trial courts may, on occasion, inform an un-
represented property owner of the existence of an innocent owner defense or 
of a right to a jury trial, I have never observed a Philadelphia trial court in-
form a property owner sua sponte that both the U.S. and Pennsylvania consti-
tutions prohibit excessive fines.  In the large number of civil forfeiture cases 
that result in default judgments, the constitution is rarely mentioned; homes 
and cars and cash are forfeited with judicial rubber-stamping of the prosecu-
tor’s paperwork.  Local courts do not even require that the government pre-
sent a prima facie showing before entering a default judgment and taking a 
home from its lawful owner.  In sharp contrast, Philadelphia courts will not 
 
201 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 846, 849. 
202 The criminal court did not impose a fine on Donald Graham for the underlying marijuana offenses 
in this case, but it did require him to pay standard court costs of approximately $700.  Common-
wealth v. Graham, No. CP-51-CR-0000643-2010 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. Sept. 15, 2010). 
203 Forfeiture Hearing,, Commonwealth v. 416 S. 62nd St., No. CP–51–MD–0002972–2010, at 97–
98 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. May 1, 2012). 
204 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 846–47 (citing Trial Court Op. at 14). 
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enter a judgment in a quiet title case that shifts legal title from a private owner 
to another unless the claimant puts forth evidence proving the essential ele-
ments of the claim, even when there is no opposition filed by the title owner.  
There are no paperwork defaults in quiet title actions as there are in civil for-
feiture actions. 
When a property owner contests a civil forfeiture petition, the Excessive 
Fines Clause must be more than a paper tiger.  However, this will not happen 
if courts rigidly apply Bajakajian’s proportionality test in the civil forfeiture 
context.  Ms. Young’s case aptly illustrates the problem.  There, the trial 
judge found that the combined value of Ms. Young’s house and car 
amounted to less than the amount of the maximum fine that could have been 
imposed on her son, and on that basis concluded that “the real property and 
vehicle forfeited were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the of-
fense.”  In a mere fifteen lines of text in her opinion, the trial judge swept 
aside Ms. Young’s constitutional defense. 
This highlights the danger of rigidly applying a gross proportionality test 
meant for criminal forfeiture in a civil forfeiture case.  Even when the prop-
erty owner was not the wrongdoer and a family home was at stake, the Young 
trial court applied the same mechanical test to determine whether a fine was 
excessive.205  It is understandable why prosecutors want to reduce the Exces-
sive Fines Clause to a mathematical comparison between these two numbers: 
Under such a test, the prosecutor almost always wins.  Yet, such a rigid “ex-
cessiveness” test negates any meaningful constitutional protection206 because 
the maximum statutory fines for most drug offenses—even minor ones—far 
exceed the market value of inner-city homes, thereby resulting in a presump-
tion against “excessiveness” and in favor of forfeiture.207 
 
205 One scholar has expressly stated that “Bajakajian does not answer every question about the test for 
excessiveness.”  Yan Slavinskiy, Protecting the Family Home by Reunderstanding United States v. Ba-
jakajian, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1619, 1634 n.121 (2014) (quoting SMITH, PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE, supra note 39, at ¶13.05). 
206 On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court in 1997 Chevrolet 
and issued a comprehensive en banc decision requiring a multi-prong, fact-intensive inquiry when 
determining whether a forfeiture is excessive.  1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 863–66.  The government 
sought review of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Com-
monwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 120 A.3d 993 (Pa. 2015), which granted the request. (This Article’s au-
thor co-authored an amicus brief in support of the property owner in that case). The parties are 
currently awaiting a ruling on the merits of that appeal. 
207 For example, in CY2010, the Philadelphia D.A.’s office filed civil forfeiture petitions against  452 
homes; the median home value was only $18,550.  See infra Appendix (ex. A.4).  Of those 452 
homes, only eight homes were assessed higher than $80,000, the maximum statutory fine for the 
low-level drug offenses charged against Ms. Young’s son.  Id.  Under the government’s arguments, 
all but those eight owners would be presumed to lack constitutional protection under the same 
circumstances as the Young case.  Moreover, the mean assessed home value in Philadelphia in 2010 
was just $44,143,52.  Id.  Thus, under the government’s interpretation of the Excessive Fines 
Clause, civil forfeiture of the average Philadelphia home (in 2010) would be presumptively consti-
tutional.  Such an interpretation eviscerates the Excessive Fines Clause; so interpreted, the Clause 
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If an Excessive Fines analysis depends upon this simple comparison of 
property value to the maximum statutory fine for the underlying offense, re-
gardless of whether a crime is even proven, the Eighth Amendment’s protec-
tion will turn mostly on the market value of a home, rather than upon indi-
vidualized considerations related to the property’s instrumentality, the 
owner’s culpability, or the owner’s personal circumstances.  In inner-city mi-
nority communities, homeowners are more vulnerable under this standard 
because their homes are generally lower in value than their suburban coun-
terparts.  Under this test, the very same underlying criminal conduct results 
in constitutional protection for wealthy families with expensive homes while 
denying similar protection to families of modest means. 
Such a test turns the Constitution on its head.  As some courts have ob-
served, property owners with fewer resources should actually enjoy greater 
constitutional protection against excessive fines.208  Otherwise, a strict pro-
portionality analysis will generally permit the forfeiture of property from per-
sons of lesser means, while prohibiting forfeiture from persons of greater 
means under identical factual circumstances.209 
This cannot be the proper constitutional test.  A robotic, mechanical eval-
uation of gross proportionality creates a tale of two cities in which the homes 
of low-income citizens are forfeited because their homes are worth less on 
the open market, leaving those who are most vulnerable to the crushing loss 
of shelter without any meaningful constitutional protection against excessive 
punishments. 
VIII.  A FACT-INTENSIVE INQUIRY MUST BALANCE FIVE ESSENTIAL 
FACTORS 
To be true to the history and purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause, I 
contend that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to conduct a fact-inten-
sive inquiry and balancing of five essential factors: (1) Instrumentality; (2) 
Culpability; (3) Proportionality; (4) Harm; and (5) Consequences.  When 
properly applied, these factors will guide courts to navigate successfully the 
imprecision inherent in excessiveness inquiries and to reach a constitutionally 
sound determination.  Ultimately, the bottom-line question is whether a for-
feiture of private property is excessive relative to something, but exactly as to 
what is admittedly complicated.  In the simple mathematical equation ad-
vanced by prosecutors, courts would sidestep this difficult question so evident 
 
would not protect the average Philadelphia homeowner against civil forfeiture of his or her home—
despite the relatively minor nature of the predicate offense(s). 
208 See, e.g., Stuart v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that a court’s 
excessive fines analysis “should consider the monetary value of the property forfeited, particularly 
in light of the claimant’s financial resources.  A forfeiture is less likely to be excessive when the 
claimant has the financial ability to replace the property without undue hardship.”). 
209 Id. at 36 n.12. 
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in the Adams and Young cases, where the homeowner and the alleged perpe-
trator are not the same person.  But the Constitution is not so easily short-
circuited. 
Until now, the proper development of a multi-factor test under the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause has been confused and even stunted by an overly-narrow 
reading and rigid application of the Bajakajian test.  Of course, Bajakajian was 
a not a civil forfeiture case; it was a criminal forfeiture case.  Thus, the Ba-
jakajian Court did not need to confront the difficult issue of determining the 
level of “wrongdoing” required to forfeit property of an owner who did not 
commit a crime.  Nor did it have to consider whether a grandparent is ex-
pected to be a guarantor that no criminal wrongdoing will ever touch her 
property.  Yet civil forfeiture raises such difficult issues.  In civil forfeiture, 
the homeowner is often not the wrongdoer, and the focus is on the “guilt” vel 
non of the realty itself.  When the government contends that the home “facil-
itated” a crime, what should be made of the homeowner’s culpability?  Will 
ordinary negligence by a non-consenting homeowner provide sufficient legal 
justification to take her home?  Or must the homeowner have engaged in 
some measure of intentional conduct to warrant the forfeiture of her home?  
And if civil forfeiture relies on the legal fiction that the property has somehow 
done wrong, just how involved in that wrongdoing must the property be? 
These questions cannot be answered by a mathematical comparison.  In-
stead, I contend that the proper constitutional test requires a court to conduct 
a meaningful factual inquiry into five factors—instrumentality, culpability, 
proportionality, harm, and consequences—and then to carefully balance 
their outcomes in order to satisfy the meaning and purpose of the Excessive 
Fines Clause. 
 
• INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE PROPERTY. Civil forfeiture is an in rem action against 
property premised on the legal fiction of “guilty” property.  Accordingly, 
courts must examine the relationship between the “suspect” property and the 
alleged offense to determine whether the property truly “facilitated” that of-
fense.  Was the property essential to the offense or was it only tangential?  As 
the property’s “instrumentality” to the alleged offense decreases, it becomes 
more likely that the forfeiture of that property constitutes an excessive fine, 
especially where the property in question is a family home. Indeed, instru-
mentality may be considered a threshold requirement; if the government is un-
able to demonstrate that the seized property is an instrumentality of the un-
derlying crime, the constitutional analysis need not go further.  Without a 
showing of instrumentality, a forfeiture is unconstitutional.210   
• CULPABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNER. While an in rem forfeiture does not require 
a criminal conviction of the property owner, it does impute some culpability 
to the owner.  Civil forfeiture is predicated upon the legal fiction of “guilty” 
property, but legal fictions can be taken too far.  It would be pure folly not to 
 
210 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet and Contents Seized from James Young [Elizabeth 
Young], No. 29 EAP 2015, 30 EAP 2015, 2017 WL 2291733, at *21–22, 27 (Pa. 2017). 
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recognize that a civil forfeiture results in the taking of a home from a person 
and usually a family.  When the perpetrator of an offense is not the home-
owner, as in both the Adams’ case and Ms. Young’s case, we must consider 
the homeowner’s relative culpability.  It may be argued that intentional con-
duct or even reckless indifference by a homeowner is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement.  But will mere negligence also suffice?  Just how much 
knowledge or inaction by a homeowner is sufficient when police initiate and 
covertly set up controlled drug buys at the home via cell phone calls to some-
one other than the property owner, and police records confirm that the home-
owner was not present when these controlled buys took place?  Clearly, the 
owner’s conduct (or lack of conduct) must be a part of a culpability determi-
nation as to whether the forfeiture of a home is excessive. 
• PROPORTIONALITY. Courts must determine the relationship between the value 
of the property and the gravity of the underlying offense to determine propor-
tionality.  But, this is not as easy as it sounds, and it certainly cannot be re-
duced to a simple equation.  How do we measure the value of a family home?  
One measure is its fair market value.  But the value of a family home is more 
than the economic value assigned to its sale in the free market.  The family 
home has special significance in both American life and jurisprudence, and 
for a low-income family it represents their most important asset that prevents 
them from slipping deeper into poverty.  It is not easily replaced.  In other 
words, home value holds a special, contextualized meaning.  Similarly, an as-
sessment of the gravity of an underlying offense may arguably begin with a 
look at the maximum statutory fine authorized by the legislature, but that as-
sessment must be balanced by other factors as well.  The actual fine imposed 
by a presiding judge who heard the facts of the criminal case is more likely to 
accurately reflect the gravity of the offense, especially when one compares the 
imposed fine to the maximum authorized fine. 
• HARM TO THE COMMUNITY.  Courts should review evidence of actual harm 
caused to the community by the offending conduct, including harm to neigh-
bors and police officers, and especially to children.  Is there a serious pattern 
of offending conduct that adversely affects the safety and welfare of others in 
close proximity?  At the same time, courts should also consider whether a 
homeowner is a constructive member of her community and a good neighbor 
whose stability helps improve the lives those around her.  It is appropriate to 
ask whether the forfeiture of a home will leave the building vacant for long 
periods of time, only contributing to urban blight and neighborhood instabil-
ity? 
• CONSEQUENCES FROM FORFEITURE. The final line of inquiry should examine 
the personal consequences that will result if a family home is forfeited to the 
government.  Will the forfeiture leave the family homeless?  Will it disrupt the 
education of innocent children?  Will it deprive the homeowner of her liveli-
hood and community support network?  Or will there be no real consequences 
to the owner, as when the property is a sham for illegal activity by non-resi-
dents or straw parties who use the building for illegal gain at the community’s 
expense? 
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These factors will require factual development and careful balancing to 
determine constitutional excessiveness, but courts are accustomed to con-
ducting such fact-intensive determinations to satisfy constitutional de-
mands.211 
While the Supreme Court has yet to establish a comprehensive test to 
determine excessiveness in in rem forfeitures, and particularly where the prop-
erty owner is not the perpetrator of the underlying crime, a growing number 
of federal and state courts have rejected the application of strict mathemati-
cal comparisons to determine constitutionality.  The Second Circuit has held 
that “[t]he greater the property’s involvement in the offense—both in terms 
of its temporal and spatial reach and the other uses to which the property 
was being put—the stronger the argument that the forfeiture is not exces-
sive.”212  The Ninth Circuit has held that the property owner’s relative cul-
pability is a necessary factor.213  And a California federal court noted that 
examining other factors beyond simply maximum authorized fines and fair 
market values provides a needed check on the government’s “potential for 
abusive use of the civil forfeiture statutes.”214 
Several state courts have also rejected a rigid mathematical test that does 
not consider other factors.  The Utah Supreme Court expressly refused to 
simply compare the value of the forfeited property to the maximum possible 
penalty, observing that, “[w]hile reference to the maximum penalties is help-
ful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it has limited relevance in de-
termining proportionality.”215  Instead, the court compared the fair market 
value of the home to the fines actually imposed, and found the forfeiture in 
that case to be grossly disproportionate.216  The court also considered other 
 
211 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that “[i]dentification of the specific 
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors . . . .” ). 
212 von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2007).  There, the court held that the 
forfeiture of a wife’s one half-interest in her home resulting from her husband’s criminal activity 
“bears no reasonable correlation either to her minimal culpability or any harm she caused.”  Id. at 
191.  See also United States v. Wagoner Cty. Real Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(considering factors including “the severity of the offense with which the property was involved, the 
harshness of the sanction imposed, . . . the culpability of the claimant[,] . . . and the property’s 
connection with the offense” because “Bajakajian in no way undermines the relevance of these fac-
tors . . . .”). 
213 United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[N]othing in Bajakajian directs a court 
to ignore the culpability of the owner and focus solely on whether the fine is excessive given the 
conduct that subjected the property to forfeiture.”). 
214 United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 735 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
215 State v. 633 E. 640 N., 994 P.2d 1254, 1261 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added).  Here, the Utah Su-
preme Court cited Bajakajian for its reasoning, and stated that, since the actual fine imposed was 
“but a fraction of the [maximum] penalties authorized,” the State cannot rely on a maximum 
possible penalty argument because “[the property owner]’s culpability relative to other potential 
violators of the . . . provision . . . is small indeed.”  Id. at 1259.  See also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 
n.14. 
216 633 E. 640 N., 994 P.2d at 1261. 
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factors in determining the “harshness of the forfeiture,” which included “the 
intangible, subjective value of the property” and “the hardship to the defend-
ant, including the effect of the forfeiture on the defendant’s family or financial 
condition.”217 
In Ms. Young’s appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania un-
derstood the importance of applying a multi-prong test.  Sitting en banc, the 
Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s grant of forfeiture and cau-
tioned that “the Eighth Amendment requires more than ‘lip service.’”218  The 
court articulated a comprehensive test requiring an intensive factual inquiry 
into several factors beginning with a threshold showing that the property was 
the instrumentality of the offense.  The next step of the Court’s analysis fo-
cused on proportionality, asserting three prongs to help guide the determi-
nation of the gravity of the offense: the actual charges and penalty as well as 
the maximum statutory fine; pattern of behavior, including timing and spac-
ing; and the actual harm caused.  The Court’s test considered whether con-
fiscation of the property was proportional to the gravity of the perpetrator’s 
offense. 
In both Ms. Young’s case and the Adams’ case, a family home was at 
stake.  Constitutional excessiveness should require an examination of the 
harm and consequences that such a forfeiture would exact upon an entire 
family, especially young children.  The family home enjoys a special place in 
American jurisprudence and is entitled to heightened constitutional protec-
tion under the Eighth Amendment.  An Alabama federal court put it this 
way: 
Obviously, the harshness of taking the roof from over the head of a person, even 
a wrongdoer, is something that must be carefully examined if the Eighth Amend-
ment is to be given meaning, as it was unanimously in Austin, even over the strong 
resistance of the United States.219 
The family home holds immense subjective value and its loss can have a dis-
astrous impact on innocent residents, especially children.220  Congress under-
stood this when it enacted CAFRA.  While Congress rejected a general right 
 
217 Id. at 1259–60.  See also Street Vendor Project v. City of New York, 841 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (2007) 
(stating that New York state courts have used a “multitude of factors test,” with sensitivity for the 
impact of a potential fine); Sarah Marx, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, First Department, 
Street Vendor Project v. City of New York, 24 TOURO L. REV. 411, 411 (2008). 
218 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 871 (citing Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d 396, 402 (Pa. 
2003)). 
219 United States v. 461 Shelby Cty. Rd., 857 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala. 1994).  See also Stuart, 963 
S.W.2d at 36 (“[T]he intangible value of the forfeited property should be considered.  For example, 
real property, especially a home, has higher intangible value than personal property.”). 
220 United States v. 7046 Park Vista Rd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 929, 941 (S.D. Ohio 2008), aff’d, 331 Fed. 
App’x 406 (6th Cir. 2009).  See United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE, 387 F.3d 758, 763 
(8th Cir. 2004) (including in its analysis “the fact that the property was a residence and the effect 
of the forfeiture on innocent occupants of the residence.”).  Legal scholars also have pointed to the 
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to counsel in federal civil forfeiture cases, it provided a right to counsel for 
indigent property owners whose primary residence was at stake.221  The dis-
placement of whole families and the potential fate of homelessness, loss of 
employment, disruption of education, and loss of neighborhood support net-
works, are critical concerns that should factor into a determination of exces-
siveness.  As a Massachusetts federal court noted, “[t]he strongest factor in 
[a] claimant’s favor is the harshness of forfeiture on innocent family mem-
bers.”222 
These same concerns led the Ninth Circuit to consider “the intangible 
value, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home.”223  
Similarly, an Ohio district court considered “whether the property was a res-
idence [and] the effect of the forfeiture on innocent occupants, including chil-
dren.”224  These concerns are appropriately heightened when the home-
owner is not the perpetrator of the underlying offense.  As the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated in an unrelated civil forfeiture 
case, 
[I]t is also our obligation to assure that these laudable goals [depriving criminals 
of the proceeds of their crimes and making communities safer] are achieved 
within constitutional boundaries.  These boundaries become more apparent 
where there is no alleged criminal conduct of the homeowner, the taking of whose 
home may result in eviction and homelessness to the homeowner and perhaps 
even several generations of a family, by the use of civil forfeiture proceedings.225 
For low-income homeowners who are least able to absorb the loss of their 
most valuable asset, these concerns weigh heavily. 
It is not only the family home that is of vital concern under the Excessive 
Fines Clause, but also the livelihood of the property owner.  As discussed 
earlier, the Excessive Fines Clause’s protection of livelihood dates back to 
 
subjective importance of a home in addition to any objective value of the property.  See e.g., Abra-
ham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 887 (2007) 
(“The property owner’s enjoyment of part of the community premium is a potentially important 
component of subjective value not reflected in the market value of an individual property.”).  See 
also D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 255 (2006).  Yan 
Slavinskiy, for example, suggests that courts should consider factors such as nexus between property 
subject to forfeiture and the underlying offense, the subjective value of the forfeited property, the 
effect of forfeiture on a defendant’s livelihood, and the effect of the forfeiture upon innocent third 
parties.  See Yan Slavinskiy, Protecting the Family Home by Reunderstanding United States v. Bajakajian, 
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1619, 1640 (2014). 
221 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2) (2017). 
222 United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 (D. Mass. 2000). 
223 United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 1995). 
224 7046 Park Vista Rd., 537 F. Supp. 2d at 941.  See also Dodge Caravan Grand SE, 387 F.3d at 763 
(including in its analysis the fact that the property was a residence and the effect of the forfeiture 
on innocent occupants of the residence). 
225 Commonwealth v. 2338 N. Beechwood St., 65 A.3d 1055, 1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013), vacated, 
114 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2015). 
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Magna Carta’s salvo contenemento principle.226  A fine should not be so severe 
as to deprive a defendant of her ability to keep a roof over her head or sup-
port herself and her family.227  The Bajakajian Court acknowledged this prop-
osition when it described the history of forfeiture and noted that Magna 
Carta required that fines should be proportioned to the offense and not de-
prive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.228 
In Ms. Young’s case, the prosecutor had the discretion not to file a civil 
forfeiture petition against an elderly grandmother’s home and car when she 
was not the wrongdoer.  But when such discretion is routinely declined, 
courts must consider the life-long impact of the loss of a home and car on a 
grandmother’s ability to put a roof over her head and meet life-threatening 
medical needs.229  Indeed, if courts do not consider such factors, it is hard to 
understand what real meaning the word “excessive” holds in our constitu-
tional framework.  And, given the strong financial self-interest that prosecu-
tors have in the proceeds of forfeited property, courts have a special obliga-
tion to assure that potential conflicts of interest do not override the sound 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
If these factors are not considered, the results will be perverse.  A test that 
simply compares a home’s fair market value to the maximum statutory fine 
for the underlying offense, even when the homeowner is not charged with a 
crime, will mean that for identical conduct poor families with lower home values 
will lose their homes to the government while affluent families with expensive 
homes will escape civil forfeiture’s harsh punishment.  This cannot be the test 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
 On the eve of publication of this article, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania issued a lengthy, unanimous decision in the Young case.230  In one of 
the most comprehensive excessive fines opinions of any court in the nation, 
the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of forfeiture of Ms. Young’s home 
and car and remanded the case to the trial court.231  In its opinion, the Court 
outlined a blueprint to guide trial courts when adjudicating excessive fines 
claims.  The Supreme Court instructed that a trial court must first determine 
 
226 See United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 
105, 113 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming that an excessive fines analysis should consider whether forfei-
ture deprives a defendant of his or her livelihood).  See also McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, 
at 853–70 (outlining the history of the Magna Carta’s Salvo Contenemento principle). 
227 See, e.g., McLean, Original Meaning, supra note 4, at 854–56. 
228 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335–36 (alluding to the Magna Carta’s principle of not depriving a man 
of his livelihood). 
229 See, e.g., 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 191.  See also 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 985 (con-
sidering “the hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the forfeiture on defendant’s family 
or financial condition.”). 
230  Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet and Contents Seized from James Young [Elizabeth Young], 
No. 29 EAP 2015, 30 EAP 2015, 2017 WL 2291733 (Pa. 2017). 
231  Id. at *1. 
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whether the seized property is an instrumentality of the underlying offense.232  
This is a threshold requirement of the excessive fines analysis. If the govern-
ment is unable to demonstrate that the property was significantly used in the 
commission of the offense, the constitutional inquiry ends and a forfeiture of 
the property is unconstitutional.  If this threshold requirement is met, the trial 
court proceeds to an analysis of proportionality to determine whether the 
value of the property is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the underly-
ing offense.233  
However, proportionality is not simply a mathematical comparison that 
was utilized by the trial court. Instead, proportionality requires careful con-
sideration of many factors that assess both objective and subjective value of 
the property, the harm that would result to the owner and innocent third par-
ties, and the impact upon the livelihood of the property owner.234  Similarly, 
the gravity of the offense is not measured simply by the maximum statutory 
fine authorized for the offense, but rather by a range of factors that include a 
close look at the nature of the offense and its relation to other illegal activity, 
a comparison of the maximum authorized penalty to the actual penalty im-
posed upon the wrongdoer, the regularity of the criminal conduct, the actual 
harm resulting from the crime beyond a generalized harm to society, and the 
culpability of the property owner.235  The trial court will be required to apply 
these factors to the Young case in a remand hearing.236  
IX.  WHOSE BURDEN IS THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE? 
The establishment of a comprehensive “excessive fines” test is a critical 
first step.  However, no matter how robust the standard is, the constitution’s 
protection against excessive fines will be ineffective unless it is known and 
available when it matters most.  Because constitutional rights are generally 
not self-enforcing, precautions must be taken to ensure that important con-
stitutional rights are not unknowingly waived. 
Few property owners facing civil forfeiture even know they have a con-
stitutional right to be free from excessive fines.  A property owner who is 
unaware of this right is also unaware that it must be timely pleaded in the 
civil forfeiture action or else forever lost.  Yet, an unaware property owner 
cannot count on the prosecutor or trial judge for enlightenment.  Property 
 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at *27. 
235  Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet and Contents Seized from James Young [Elizabeth Young], 
No. 29 EAP 2015, 30 EAP 2015, 2017 WL 2291733, at *27 (Pa. 2017). 
236 Id. 
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owners facing civil forfeiture do not receive a Miranda-like notice of their con-
stitutional right to be free of excessive fines (or any instruction on what they 
must do to assert it).237  This then raises two important questions. 
First, should the government be required to notify property owners of 
their constitutional right to be free of excessive fines when it pursues civil 
forfeiture?  Second, should a trial court be required to ensure that a property 
owner’s waiver of this right is knowing and intelligent, as courts routinely do 
when they conduct on-record plea colloquies in criminal cases?238 
As a matter of due process, waivers of constitutional rights in criminal pro-
ceedings must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.239  To satisfy this waiver 
standard, an accused must be aware of the constitutional right and the conse-
quences of forfeiting that right.240  This strict waiver standard is essential to 
ensuring that an accused receives a fair trial,241 the hallmark of which is a 
“verdict worthy of confidence.”242  Accordingly, a strict waiver standard goes 
to the integrity of convictions, and this is important because of the consequences 
of conviction; to wit—punishment of the convict.243  In turn, the integrity of 
a conviction bears on the justness of such punishment.244  If a conviction lacks 
integrity, punishment of the individual so convicted is unjust.245  Ultimately, 
 
237 The public may possess a general understanding of their Miranda rights, gleaned from popular TV 
shows such as Law and Order.  Yet the public almost certainly lacks a comparable understanding of 
their constitutional right to be free from excessive fines—particularly in the civil forfeiture context.  
Thus, it is arguably even more important that persons facing civil forfeiture be notified of their 
constitutional right to be free of excessive fines. 
238 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, has “required of record, a full and complete col-
loquy . . . in the context of waiving the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, and entering a 
guilty plea as opposed to proceeding to trial.”  Commonwealth v. Vega, 719 A.2d 227, 230 
(Pa. 1998).  The colloquy is a mechanism to ensure that such waivers are voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent, as due process of law requires.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 
(1969) (“A defendant who enters [a guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitutional 
rights . . . . [I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained 
in violation of due process and is therefore void.”). 
239 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (emphasizing the importance of a waiver of 
constitutional right being done intelligently and knowingly). 
240 See e.g., Vega, 719 A.2d at 230.  See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (mandating that 
a valid waiver requires “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege.”). 
241 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (applying the standard of a knowing an 
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights in an assessment of a waiver of right to trial). 
242 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
243 See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942); Commonwealth v. 
Wharton, 435 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1981) (“The procedures which constitute due process of 
law . . . are not ends in themselves but means of safeguarding [the] substantive rights” of life, liberty, 
and property). 
244 See, e.g., Adams, 317 U.S. at 279; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462–65; Wharton, 435 A.2d at 161. 
245 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“The goal of a just result is not divorced 
from the reliability of a conviction . . . .”) 
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then, the requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of con-
stitutional rights goes to the justness of punishment.246 
Of course, “[t]he notion of punishment . . . cuts across the division be-
tween the civil and the criminal law.”247  Indeed, “civil proceedings may ad-
vance punitive as well as remedial goals.”248  In rem civil forfeiture is punitive 
in nature; civil forfeiture extinguishes an individual’s private property rights 
without compensating him or her for that loss.  And civil forfeiture’s punitive 
nature is precisely why it is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.249  Because 
the “forfeiture of one’s home implicates the fundamental rights of ‘personal 
security,’ ‘personal liberty,’ and ‘private property,’”250 we must question 
whether fundamental fairness demands that individuals faced with civil for-
feiture of their home be notified of their constitutional right to be free from 
excessive fines.251  Insofar as civil forfeiture proceedings implicate these fun-
damental rights, surely “[t]he goal of a just result is not divorced from . . . the 
fairness and regularity of the processes that precede[]”252 a decree of forfei-
ture.  A forfeiture may be unjust if “processes that preceded it” were unfair 
or irregular (or both).253  “And, of course, even those protections associated 
with criminal cases may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding if it is so puni-
tive that [it] must reasonably be considered criminal.”254 
Surely, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more punitive result than the forfei-
ture of one’s home . . . when . . . there [are] no convictions of the homeowner 
for any of the underlying offenses that could result in forfeiture, [and] no 
charges have ever been alleged or filed against the [homeowner].”255  Ac-
cordingly, all homeowners faced with civil forfeiture of their home should be 
notified of their constitutional right to be free of excessive fines, and a waiver 
of that right should be valid only if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
Yet, another fundamental question still remains.  In a civil forfeiture ac-
tion, which party should bear the burden of proof with respect to the Exces-
sive Fines Clause?  Should the government bear the burden of establishing 
 
246 A conviction may be unjust if “the processes that preceded it” were unfair or irregular (or both).  
Id.  Surely it follows that punishment predicated upon an unjust conviction is also unjust. 
247 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989)). 
248 Id. (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447). 
249 Id. at 621–22. 
250 2338 N. Beechwood St., 65 A.3d at 1063–64 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)).  See also James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 61 (“At stake in . . . forfeiture cases [against 
an individual’s home] are the security and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within 
it.”); von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 188 (quoting James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53) (finding that 
forfeiture of one’s home implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest—the right “to be 
free from governmental interference”). 
251 2338 N. Beechwood St., 65 A.3d at 1063 (questioning whether fundamental fairness has prevailed 
when a claimant in civil forfeiture action was never notified of her right to a jury trial). 
252 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
253 Id. 
254 Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n.4. 
255 2338 N. Beechwood St., 65 A.3d at 1065. 
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that a proposed forfeiture is not “excessive”?  Or should the property owner 
bear the burden of establishing that the proposed forfeiture is “excessive”?  
In a criminal forfeiture case, if the property owner is duly convicted of the 
crime(s) upon which the forfeiture is based, it may be justifiable to require 
the property owner to prove “excessiveness”.  In such a case, the government 
has already proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the property owner is 
guilty of the crime(s) upon which the forfeiture is based.  Yet in the civil for-
feiture context, the government need not even charge the property owner with 
the crime(s) upon which the forfeiture is based.  If the government pursues 
civil forfeiture against an individual’s home, but never charges the home-
owner with a crime, there is a stronger argument that fundamental fairness 
requires the government to bear the burden of demonstrating compliance 
with the Excessive Fines Clause. 
After all, it is the government’s choice whether to pursue criminal or civil 
forfeiture.  If government chooses civil forfeiture, where legal protections for 
the homeowner are much weaker, shouldn’t it bear the burden of demon-
strating compliance with the Eighth Amendment before a home is taken 
from a family and handed over to the prosecutor’s office?256  And, in the final 
analysis, shouldn’t a trial court—as guardian of the Constitution—have the 
solemn duty of ensuring that an unjust, unconstitutional punishment does 
not occur? 
CONCLUSION 
Intended to take away the tools of the trade from drug kingpins in the 
War on Drugs, civil forfeiture is now aggressively directed against ordinary 
citizens for low-level drug offenses.  Civil forfeiture’s modern history is 
marked by high default rates, persistent abuses, and disproportionate en-
forcement.  Despite this history, the Eighth Amendment’s counter-balance 
to the government’s raw punishment power has yet to receive the careful 
judicial development that it deserves.  The government’s seizure of family 
homes from parents and grandparents who have not committed a crime and 
 
256 In civil forfeiture proceedings requiring the property owner to bear the burden of proving “exces-
siveness”, it can be argued that such a burden allocation fails to sufficiently protect the property 
owner’s “core constitutional right” to be free of excessive fines.  United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 
22, 28 (1st Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, any legislative prescription of such a burden allocation should 
be proscribed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See, e.g., 
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996) (finding the legislative “power to regulate proce-
dural burdens [is] subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause[s]” of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments if a particular burden allocation fails to sufficiently protect a “fundamental 
constitutional right.”).  It may seem unorthodox to place the burden on the government to prove 
a negative, i.e.—that a proposed forfeiture is not excessive.  Yet, claimants seeking to defend their 
property in civil forfeiture proceedings already bear the burden of proving a negative; to wit—that 
their property has done no wrong, or if it has, that they did not know or consent to such wrongdo-
ing. 
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the transfer of their hard-earned equity to the budgets of law enforcement 
agencies demand greater court scrutiny. 
The several studies discussed in this Article reveal that civil forfeiture un-
fairly plagues low-income and minority communities, which only under-
mines public confidence in law enforcement authorities.  As former Attorney 
General Eric Holder stated in testimony before Congress, “[N]o tool of law 
enforcement, however effective at fighting crime, can survive for long if the 
public thinks that it violates the basic principles of fairness and due process 
that lie at the core of the American system of justice.”257  It may be that civil 
forfeiture is now beyond repair.  Two former Department of Justice employ-
ees who were original architects of the modern civil forfeiture program 
voiced this belief in a letter to the Washington Post: 
[CAFRA] was enacted in 2000 to rein in abuses, but virtually nothing has 
changed.  This is because civil forfeiture is fundamentally at odds with our judi-
cial system and notions of fairness.  It is unreformable. . . . The program began 
with good intentions but now, having failed in both purpose and execution, it 
should be abolished.258 
As long as prosecutors use civil forfeiture to seize family homes from the 
innocent, our courts will have a solemn duty to vigorously enforce the Exces-
sive Fines Clause and protect vulnerable homeowners who are caught in the 
crosshairs of abusive punishment. 
 
257 Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice 
Oversight of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 19 (1999) (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
258 John Yoder & Brad Cates, Government Self-Interest Corrupted a Crime-Fighting Tool Into an Evil, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://wapo.st/1mjYkQg?tid=ss_mail. 
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EXHIBIT A.3. 
PHILADELPHIA 2015 PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
 
PHILADELPHIA PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
WARD 2015 ASSESSMENT VALUE ($) 
NUMBER OF  
ACCOUNTS 
AVERAGE 
VALUE ($) 
1 1,333,495,400 7,296 182,770 
2 2,215,521,700 7,768 285,211 
3 421,218,900 6,811 61,843 
4 413,645,500 7,627 54,234 
5 2,190,630,300 5,184 422,575 
6 271,255,900 4,782 56,724 
7 346,686,600 8,627 40,186 
8 1,479,945,500 2,466 600,140 
9 1,738,781,600 4,439 391,705 
10 977,519,100 8,658 112,903 
11 201,236,000 5,609 35,877 
12 616,311,500 7,072 87,148 
13 439,810,200 7,586 57,976 
14 219,299,900 1,430 153,356 
15 1,724,970,900 4,881 353,405 
16 135,014,000 5,763 23,427 
17 717,038,500 7,629 93,988 
18 894,200,200 7,222 123,816 
19 258,839,200 7,833 33,044 
20 149,504,400 2,415 61,906 
21 3,259,849,100 15,175 214,817 
22 1,443,489,100 7,240 199,376 
23 659,064,500 7,651 86,140 
24 471,659,900 4,407 107,025 
25 661,378,500 8,694 76,072 
26 1,355,377,101 7,045 192,388 
27 436,590,300 2,708 161,222 
28 123,719,200 6,665 18,562 
29 284,384,200 5,079 55,992 
30 1,861,391,700 5,489 339,113 
31 746,783,700 7,444 100,320 
32 446,917,000 8,224 54,343 
33 564,223,400 8,353 67,547 
34 1,498,055,200 12,568 119,195 
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PHILADELPHIA PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
WARD 2015 ASSESSMENT VALUE ($) 
NUMBER OF  
ACCOUNTS 
AVERAGE 
VALUE ($) 
35 1,039,093,900 9,728 106,814 
36 1,091,809,100 14,149 77,165 
37 235,172,000 6,679 35,210 
38 755,598,200 6,451 117,128 
39 2,148,341,100 16,179 132,785 
40 1,174,587,900 16,192 72,541 
41 827,328,900 7,917 104,500 
42 804,786,700 9,782 82,272 
43 406,479,400 7,927 51,277 
44 242,865,500 5,844 41,558 
45 908,169,400 9,797 92,698 
46 856,169,500 5,215 164,174 
47 246,448,700 2,721 90,572 
48 573,460,300 6,738 85,108 
49 714,021,600 7,639 93,470 
50 1,375,278,600 9,456 145,439 
51 450,519,600 8,309 54,220 
52 761,885,700 6,139 124,105 
53 1,020,874,300 7,502 136,080 
54 898,696,000 7,202 124,784 
55 1,237,008,200 9,625 128,520 
56 1,737,825,000 9,812 177,112 
57 1,326,996,000 7,287 182,104 
58 3,040,340,500 13,725 221,518 
59 725,291,100 6,000 120,881 
60 517,051,100 5,733 90,188 
61 1,049,522,000 8,778 119,562 
62 909,136,400 9,504 95,658 
63 1,542,604,100 7,201 214,220 
64 824,404,500 5,321 154,934 
65 967,436,800 6,659 145,282 
66 2,568,413,000 14,014 183,274 
TOTAL 63,535,423,301 503,065  
  AVERAGE 126,296 
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EXHIBIT A.4. 
PHILADELPHIA 2010 PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
PHILADELPHIA PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
WARD 2010 ASSESSMENT VALUE ($) 
NUMBER OF  
ACCOUNTS 
AVERAGE 
VALUE ($) 
1 269,705,100 7,548 35,731 
2 710,717,300 8,191 86,768 
3 191,420,500 7,115 26,903 
4 152,532,100 7,876 19,366 
5 801,793,200 5,353 149,783 
6 85,266,700 5,204 16,384 
7 108,043,500 8,938 12,088 
8 579,012,850 2,591 223,470 
9 777,019,100 4,483 173,325 
10 405,251,400 8,706 46,548 
11 94,537,900 5,931 15,939 
12 212,049,800 7,310 29,008 
13 181,760,000 7,936 22,903 
14 63,823,600 1,567 40,729 
15 501,448,200 5,141 97,539 
16 49,206,600 5,930 8,297 
17 258,048,700 7,775 33,189 
18 188,621,600 7,484 25,203 
19 40,531,739 8,083 5,014 
20 41,770,100 2,510 16,641 
21 1,212,862,200 15,061 80,529 
22 561,918,500 7,321 76,754 
23 238,054,900 7,906 30,110 
24 107,802,700 4,635 23,258 
25 199,435,200 9,097 21,923 
26 480,522,200 7,288 65,933 
27 128,763,400 2,865 44,943 
28 57,893,500 6,849 8,452 
29 82,164,445 5,340 15,386 
30 353,425,900 5,666 62,376 
31 173,302,300 7,532 23,008 
32 71,544,800 8,547 8,370 
33 252,895,500 8,608 29,379 
34 525,678,200 13,001 40,433 
35 461,464,800 9,938 46,434 
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PHILADELPHIA PROPERTY VALUES BY WARD 
WARD 2010 ASSESSMENT VALUE ($) 
NUMBER OF  
ACCOUNTS 
AVERAGE 
VALUE ($) 
36 205,179,500 14,776 13,885 
37 37,981,900 6,994 5,430 
38 277,411,800 6,587 42,115 
39 568,419,100 16,946 33,542 
40 578,856,300 16,673 34,718 
41 335,931,700 8,111 41,416 
42 311,668,200 10,108 30,833 
43 104,574,200 8,231 12,704 
44 100,107,800 6,149 16,280 
45 317,305,000 10,019 31,670 
46 253,050,200 5,434 46,567 
47 49,780,600 3,012 16,527 
48 210,501,200 6,988 30,123 
49 255,324,300 8,634 29,571 
50 557,223,300 9,540 58,409 
51 182,273,900 8,540 21,343 
52 329,538,600 6,213 53,040 
53 434,185,600 7,570 57,356 
54 361,555,000 7,243 49,917 
55 500,675,700 9,743 51,388 
56 763,173,300 9,947 76,723 
57 570,254,900 7,282 78,310 
58 1,309,308,800 13,724 95,402 
59 250,490,700 6,092 41,117 
60 167,991,500 6,048 27,776 
61 439,375,400 9,006 48,786 
62 131,390,500 4,147 31,683 
63 648,393,200 7,236 89,606 
64 338,525,600 5,396 62,736 
65 394,805,800 6,726 58,698 
66 1,016,011,100 14,017 72,484 
TOTAL 22,621,553,234 512,458  
  AVERAGE 44,143 
 
